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This thesis contains three chapters, each a separate essay on endogenous growth.
In Chapter 1, we compare unfunded social security with reform-favored compul-
sory individual savings in an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous accidental
bequests and public schooling and without annuity markets. We show that compul-
sory individual savings should be inframarginal and neutral. By contrast, the unfunded
scheme improves welfare for workers receiving no bequests, unless the survival rate
becomes too high or the taste for old-age consumption is too weak; and it may also
promote growth. Because retired agents gain from receiving intergenerational transfers
from workers, their joint voice with have-no workers makes it unlikely for compulsory
individual savings to win majority support.
Chapter 2 studies the overlapping generation model of a small open economy, adopt-
ing an expanding-product-variety framework with two final good sectors, manufacture
and service. The variety of intermediate goods increases and generates monopoly profits
for R&D firms. We find that when the consumers’ tastes for manufacture and service
goods are nonhomothetic, the economy is stable and will converge to the steady-state of
iv
the homothetic preferences case if the monopoly mark-up is high. When price of service
grows slowly, our numerical simulations are consistent with the empirical facts of struc-
tural change, such that in the short run and long run, relative price for service goods will
increase, the employment and nominal output share of service sector will also increase.
In Chapter 3 we discuss the nonhomothetic tastes of consumers and the structural
change using infinite horizon agent model. We also compare our results with the over-
lapping generation model in Chapter 2. Unlike in Chapter 2, we find that there exists
transitional dynamics in the homothetic system of the IH model in order to satisfy the
transversality condition. The initial growth rate is determined by the initial endowment
as well as the technological level. There are two steady-states in the homothetic system.
Depending on the parameter values, one of them is stable and the other is unstable. The
nonhomothetic system converges to the stable homothetic steady-state asymptotically.
One of homothetic steady-states is empirically more likely to be stable. In such case, a
higher initial endowment leads to a higher initial growth rate. When the initial growth
rate is lower than the stable steady-state, the employment share and nominal output share
of the service sector will increase at the early stages of the transition, which is consistent
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Chapter 1
Compulsory Retirement Savings vs.
Unfunded Social Security with
Unintended Bequests and Public
Schooling
Introduction
The rapid process of population aging in the last several decades, largely due to steady
mortality decline, has been increasingly challenging to unfunded social security. It
forces governments across nations to reduce social security benefits, raise social se-
curity contributions, or adopt reform proposals to replace unfunded social security with
compulsory retirement savings in individual accounts.
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The underlying rationale for the social security reform is embedded in typical results
in life-cycle models of neoclassical growth whereby unfunded social security reduces
life-cycle savings and impedes growth; see e.g. Feldstein (1974). With a constant labor
force, unfunded social security also reduces social welfare when the wage growth rate
is lower than the interest rate. According to Cooley and Soares (1999) that divides
life cycle into two working periods and one retirement period, unfunded social security
reduces welfare of all workers who form a majority when initially introduced. But once
established, it is better to remain in place for the two elder groups that together form a
majority in a political equilibrium among different age groups with conflicting interests.
In Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), unfunded social security, together with government
funding for education, may improve welfare in the long run only when the desire for
old-age consumption and the altruism toward child education are sufficiently strong. In a
dynastic family model, unfunded social security improves social welfare in the presence
of either an investment externality in final production, as in Zhang and Zhang (2007), or
a human capital externality in the education sector, as in Yew and Zhang (forthcoming).
However, these studies of social security ignore accidental bequests from savers who fail
to survive to retirement as these life-cycle models usually assume certain survivals and
perfect annuity markets. Ito and Tabata (2008) show that with unfunded social security,
the relationship between the survival rate and per capita output growth is hump shaped.
However, they also assume a perfect annuity market and the social security tax rate is
not chosen by welfare optimization.
In this paper, we compare the compulsory individual savings scheme to an unfunded
public retirement annuity scheme in an endogenous growth model with life-cycle sav-
ings, heterogeneous accidental bequests and public schooling in the absence of private
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annuity markets. We show that compulsory individual savings should be inframarginal
and neutral. By contrast, the unfunded scheme improves welfare for workers receiving
no bequests, unless the survival rate becomes too high or the taste for old-age consump-
tion is too weak; and it may raise the growth rate as well. For quantitative implica-
tions, our numerical examples illustrate that the unfunded scheme improves welfare for
these have-no workers for plausible parameterizations. As retired agents also gain from
receiving intergenerational transfers from workers, their joint voice with the have-no
workers makes it unlikely for compulsory individual savings to win majority support.
Thus, when choosing between the unfunded scheme and the compulsory individual sav-
ing scheme via majority voting as in the New Zealand Referendum in 1997, our result
can explain why a vast majority defended the unfunded scheme in that referendum.
A unique feature of our analysis of social security is the consideration of accidental
bequests due to the absence of private annuity markets. This consideration introduces
heterogeneity in the population because the amount of such bequests depends critically
on the mortality history in each family. This feature is highly relevant in the real world
because of at least two stylized facts. One fact is that the private annuity market has
been well known to be very thin in many developed countries, as noted in Brown, Casey
and Mitchell (2008) and Piggott, Valdez and Dentzel (2005), among others. The other
fact is that bequests, perhaps accidental to a large extent, have been found to be a ma-
jor component of the capital stock according to evidence from US data; see, Kotlikoff
and Summers (1981), Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1997), and Laitner and Thomas
(1996).
Because individuals do not directly derive utility from accidental bequests, this
model brings to light an important attribute of unfunded social security with annuity
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payment: It helps to avoid excessive savings for retirement in the absence of private
annuity markets. In particular, unless the survival rate becomes sufficiently high, the an-
nuity rate of return to unfunded social security can be higher than the interest rate even
when the wage growth rate is lower than the interest rate without private annuity mar-
kets. This result helps explain why unfunded social security can lead to higher welfare
than compulsory individual savings to the majority of the population.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model.
Sections 3 and 4 characterize the equilibrium solutions under compulsory savings in
individual accounts and under unfunded social security with pooled annuity payment,
respectively. In these sections, we also derive some analytical results. Section 5 makes
numerical comparisons among these programs in terms of growth and welfare for vari-
ous parameterizations. The last section concludes.
1.1 The Model
The model economy is inhabited by overlapping generations of agents who may live for
a maximum of three periods (childhood, the working period, and the old-age period in
retirement, respectively). We assume certain survival through the first and the second
period of life for all agents for the purpose of comparing these different programs in
developed countries in which mortality becomes a major concern only in later life for
a typical individual. At the end of the second period of life, there is a probability of
death p ∈ (0, 1) for all agents. Thus, the rate of survival from the second period to the
end of the third (last) period of life is 1 − p, and life expectancy at birth is 3 − p. We
also assume that each worker has exactly one child. For convenience, we normalize the
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size of every child generation as well as every working generation to unity. Because
most individuals survive into retirement in developed countries, we assume p ≤ 1/2
throughout the paper.
There are no private annuity markets in this model economy.1 As a result, the savings
plus interest returns of savers who fail to survive to old age are left as accidental bequests
to their children. Thus, individuals differ by the amount of accidental bequests according
to their family mortality histories. A type j agent is defined as one whose exactly j
consecutive proceeding generations have died at the end of their working age. With
j = 0, 1, 2, ..., the number of agents in each type is equal to (p) j(1 − p).2
The preferences of workers are identical. The utility of a type j worker born at time
t is defined over his consumptions in the middle-age and the old-age (c j1,t, c
j
2,t+1) and the










1−σ , for σ , 1,
ln c j1,t + (1 − p)δ ln c j2,t+1 + φ ln qt, for σ = 1,
(1.1.1)
where σ > 0 is the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion and 1/σ is the constant
elasticity of intertemporal substitution; δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor on utility derived
from old-age consumption; and φ > 0 is the taste for utility derived from the average
1Nevertheless, the analysis of social security in the presence of private annuity markets can be found
in Feldstein (1974), Cooley and Soares (1999), Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), Zhang, Zhang and Lee
(2001) and Zhang and Zhang (2007), among many others, whereby there is no accidental bequest. Our
approach complements those in the existing studies.
2Time t can be considered as an arbitrary point of the infinite time internal, with infinite time periods
before and after. Thus the population size of the young agent at any time is unitary.
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school quality in the economy.3 The assumption of average rather than individual school
quality in the preference is based on two reasons. One reason is to simplify the analysis
by suppressing heterogeneity in human capital that would otherwise arise and make the
model intractable. The other is that public schooling is supported by the majority of
voters, as observed in developed countries, as long as there is inequality in initial human
capital according to Glomm and Ravikumar (1992).
The education technology converts average human capital in the parental generation
ht and average school quality qt into equal human capital for every child h
j
t+1 = ht+1:
ht+1 = Aqαt h
1−α
t , A > 0, 0 < α < 1. (1.1.2)
Every mid-age adult works for one unit of time inelastically, earns a wage income
wt, and may receive a bequest b
j
t that equals the amount of saving s
j−1
t if his or her parent
died at the end of working age according to family type j:
b jt =

s j−1t−1 for j ≥ 1,
0 for j = 0.
(1.1.3)
By construction, type-0 workers receive no accidental bequests because their parents
survive to old age and consume all old-age income.
Wage income is taxed at a rate τ for public school financing. Each worker spends
3An alternative formulation of the altruism is to have children’s utility in the preference as in Barro
(1974) and Drazen (1978). However, since we assume no intended bequest, the only control variable that
can affect children’s utility is the input on their education. Thus we use the measurement of the school
quality in the utility function for tractability. And since we assume education is purely public, it will only
be shown in the government’s budget constraint.
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the after-tax wage income and the bequest income on life-cycle consumption:
c j1,t = (1 + rt)b
j
t + (1 − τt)wt − s jt , (1.1.4)
c j2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)s
j
t , (1.1.5)
where rt is the interest rate.
The government runs a balanced budget in every period:
qt = τtwt. (1.1.6)
We shall allow the government to choose the tax rate for public schooling along with its
choice of various government programs for retirement income security to maximize the
welfare of the majority of workers. Under the assumption p ≤ 1/2, it is type-0 workers
that form the majority of the working population. Without receiving any bequests, they
are in fact more in need than others for government assistance for the old-age income
security. When comparing between compulsory individual savings and unfunded so-
cial security later, we will also consider how old survivors differentiate between these
programs. This approach conforms to majority voting.
The production of a single final good converts human and physical capital (ht, kt)
into output yt according to a Cobb-Douglas function:
yt = Dkθt h
1−θ
t , D > 0, 0 < θ < 1. (1.1.7)
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Production factors earn their marginal products in a competitive manner:
1 + rt = θDµθ−1t , (1.1.8)
wt = (1 − θ)Dµθt ht, (1.1.9)
where µ = k/h stands for the ratio of physical to human capital. The market clearing
condition for physical capital is given below to close the model in the absence of social
security such that the aggregate physical capital kt+1 equals to the aggregate savings st
from the previous period:




j(1 − p). (1.1.10)
In the remainder of the paper, we shall analyze compulsory savings in individual
accounts and unfunded social security with pooled annuity benefits, respectively. Be-
cause of the difficulty in obtaining reduced-form solutions in this complicated model
with heterogeneity in individuals’ bequests, we shall derive conditions that characterize
the solutions implicitly. From these implicit solutions, we shall derive some analytical
results and provide numerical examples for various parameterizations as well.
1.2 Compulsory Savings in Individual Accounts
In the last two decades, there has been increasing pressure for reforming unfunded social
security toward compulsory individual savings. In the developed world, for example,
Australia has abandoned its public pension and instituted compulsory superannuation
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savings registered in individual accounts as a substitute. The compulsory savings plus
interest income of deceased account holders in such a superannuation system are trans-
ferable to their surviving family members as bequests. Let ηt denote the rate of such
compulsory savings to wage income. In addition to the compulsory individual savings,
workers can still save voluntarily. The budget constraints become:
c j1,t = (1 + rt)b
j
t + (1 − τt − ηt)wt − s jt , (1.2.1)
c j2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)(s
j
t + wtηt). (1.2.2)
The physical capital market clears when
kt+1 = st + wtηt. (1.2.3)
As both voluntary and compulsory individual savings can be left to children as acci-




s j−1t + wtηt for j ≥ 1,
0 for j = 0.
(1.2.4)
For a given kt at the beginning of period t, the initial aggregate bequest is equal to
bt = pkt that falls when the survival (mortality) rate rises (falls).
In dealing with the equilibrium solution, there may exist different cases concerning
whether or not the government takes into account the feedback effects of its policies
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(ηt, τt) on market prices (rt+1,wt+1) through the physical to human capital ratio µt+1. We
shall concentrate on the case in which the government chooses (ηt, τt) to maximize the
welfare of type-0 workers for p ≤ 1/2 (as a result of majority voting), by taking into
account these market feedbacks. In principle, considering such feedback effects leads to
higher welfare for these workers than otherwise.
The problem is solved in two stages. In the first stage, a worker chooses voluntary
saving s jt , taking his or her received bequest b
j
t , the sequences of government variables
(ηt+i, τt+i) and the market prices (rt+i,wt+i) for i ≥ 0 as given: maxs jt U
j
t in (1.1.1) subject
to budget constraints (1.2.1) and (1.2.2), implying the optimal condition
(c j1,t)
−σ = δ(1 − p)(1 + rt+1)(c j2,t+1)−σ. (1.2.5)
Together with the budget constraints, it leads to the following solution for s jt :
s jt = dt+1[wt(1 − τt) + (1 + rt)b jt ] − wtηt (1.2.6)
where
dt+1 =
[δ(1 − p)]1/σ(1 + rt+1)(1−σ)/σ
1 + [δ(1 − p)]1/σ(1 + rt+1)(1−σ)/σ .
Here, dt+1 is the desired rate of total saving to income. According to (1.2.6), com-
pulsory savings wtηt and voluntary savings s
j
t have a one-for-one trade-off. When the
compulsory saving rate is inframarginal (i.e. less than the desired rate of total savings),
the compulsory individual saving scheme is neutral as is known in the literature (e.g.
Zhang, 1995). Also, voluntary savings are increasing with accidental bequests b jt and
with the rate of survival 1 − p, other things being equal. The relation of the saving rate
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dt+1 to the interest rate rt+1 hinges on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/σ: It
is independent of the interest rate when 1/σ = 1 (unitary or proportional intertemporal
substitution); it is decreasing with the interest rate when 1/σ < 1 (less than proportional
intertemporal substitution); it is increasing with the interest rate when 1/σ > 1 (more
than proportional intertemporal substitution).
Summing over (1.2.6), the aggregate voluntary saving is equal to
st = dt+1[wt(1 − τt) + (1 + rt)bt] − wtηt, (1.2.7)
and accordingly the stock of physical capital in the next period is equal to
kt+1 = st + wtηt = dt+1[wt(1 − τt) + (1 + rt)bt]. (1.2.8)
The aggregate bequest is equal to bt+1 = pkt+1.
In the second stage, the government chooses τt to maximize the welfare of type-0
workers, recognizing the feedback effect from the interest rate rt+1:
(c j1,t)
−σ = (1 − p)δ(c j2,t+1)−σdt+1(1 − τt)
∂rt+1
∂τt
+ φq−σt . (1.2.9)
The first term on the right-hand side is the feedback effect of the tax for school funding
on the next period interest rate, which will influence old-age consumption through the
return on savings. The government also chooses η to maximize the welfare of type-0
workers, taking into account the feedback effect:
(c01t)
−σwt = δ(1 − p)(c02t+1)−σ
[






where the left-hand side is the marginal cost of compulsory individual savings and the
right-hand side is the marginal benefit. We first conclude that the compulsory saving
rate should be inframarginal and neutral.
Proposition 1.1 The compulsory individual saving rate should be inframarginal and
neutral.
Proof. Intuitively, since the compulsory individual saving yields the same rate of return
as the voluntary saving, the compulsory saving should offset the voluntary saving one
by one. Dividing both sides of (1.2.10) by wt and comparing it to (1.2.5) for j = 0, the
marginal costs of voluntary and compulsory savings are the same. The marginal benefit
of compulsory saving less that of voluntary saving is signed by




According to (1.1.2), it is clear that ∂ht+1/∂ηt = 0. Therefore, sign ∂µt+1/∂ηt = sign
∂kt+1/∂ηt, and hence sign ∂rt+1/∂η = − sign ∂kt+1/∂ηt from the interest rate equation.
If the compulsory individual saving rate were extramarginal (i.e. ∂kt+1/∂ηt > 0), then
∂rt+1/∂ηt < 0 would follow, implying that the net marginal benefit of compulsory saving
would be less than that of voluntary saving according to (1.2.11). In other words, an
extramarginal compulsory saving scheme is welfare reducing at the margin and is thus
not to be chosen. If the scheme is inframarginal (i.e. ∂kt+1/∂ηt = 0), then ∂rt+1/∂ηt =
0 and thus the difference in (1.2.11) is equal to zero. In this inframarginal case, the
compulsory individual saving rate is indeterminate and is neutral. Q.E.D.
This result is useful in some important ways. First, it does not justify any extra-
marginal rate of compulsory individual savings that forces type-0 workers to save more
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than they want in our model with a heterogeneous population. Second, it conforms to
the conventional view that inframarginal compulsory individual savings are neutral. In
addition, it allows us to concentrate on the inframarginal case in which the saving func-
tion in (1.2.6) applies in the same way regardless of whether the compulsory saving
scheme is present or absent.
To pin down the feedback effect, we need to determine the evolution of the ratio of
physical to human capital according to (1.1.2) and (1.2.8):
µ1+(1−θ)(1−σ)/σt+1 Aτ
α
t [D(1 − θ)]α
{





pθ + (1 − θ)(1 − τt)] . (1.2.12)
From this and the updated interest rate equation 1 + rt+1 = θDµθ−1t+1 , one can determine
the feedback effects (∂rt+1/∂τt, ∂µt+1/∂τt). Note that the initial stocks (ht, kt) in period t
determine current prices (rt,wt) according to (1.1.8) and (1.1.9). The system of equa-
tions derived so far implicitly characterizes the solutions for
(bt+1, τt, ht+1, kt+1, µt, rt,wt, µt+1, rt+1,wt+1), given initial stocks (ht, kt) in period t.
When σ = 1 (log utility), we show that the system is globally convergent to its
unique long-run balanced growth path. Numerical simulations show that for the case of
σ = 2, the long-run balanced growth rate also exists.
Proposition 1.2 For σ = 1, the economy with or without the compulsory individual
savings scheme is globally convergent to a unique balanced growth path.
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Proof. With σ = 1, the model yields a reduced-form solution as follows:
s0t + wtηt =
wtδ(1 − p)(1 − τt)








where a¯ = (1 − θ)[1 + δ(1 − p) + φ − δ(1 − p)(1 − θ)(1 − α)] > 0, b¯ = −(1 − θ +
θp)[1 + δ(1 − p) + φ] − φ(1 − θ) − δ(1 − p)(1 − θ)[α(1 − θ) + αθp − (1 − θ)(1 − α)] < 0,
and c¯ = [φ + αδ(1 − p)(1 − θ)](1 − θ + θp) > 0. The solution is time invariant and is
independent of initial stocks (ht, kt), which is a special feature with log utility and Cobb-
Douglas technologies. The second-order condition ∂2u0t /∂τ
2
t < 0 can be shown as valid
at this optimal τ∗. We can also show that the second-order condition is violated under
the other root τ = [−b¯ +
√
b¯2 − 4a¯c¯]/(2a¯); we thus exclude it as an optimal solution.4
For σ = 1, the evolution of the physical to human capital ratio boils down to:
µt+1 =
Dδ(1 − p)[(1 − θ)(1 − τ∗) + θp]
A(τ∗)α[D(1 − θ)]α[1 + δ(1 − p)]µ
θ(1−α)
t . (1.2.15)
With a positive coefficient and an exponent θ(1−α) ∈ (0, 1) on µt, this evolution process
is globally convergent to a unique µ∞ > 0. Q.E.D.
To reveal the quantitative implications of the model for plausible parameterizations,
we conduct numerical simulations and report some numerical examples in Tables 1 to
4. The parameterization is discussed in the Appendix. For the compulsory individual
saving scheme, the compulsory saving rate is found to be inframarginal and neutral
for all levels of 1 − p from 0.5 to 0.9 as shown in Proposition 1. In other words, the
4Parameter values for numerical simulations are discussed in the Appendix.
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compulsory saving rate is indeterminate in all the tables. The optimal tax rate for public
schooling, on the other hand, is always increasing with the rate of survival in all the
tables, leading to higher human capital. A key reason for this is that increasing human
capital raises the rate of return on life-cycle savings rt+1 in order to meet the increased
demand for old-age consumption when facing enhanced survival, as captured by the
first component of the marginal benefit of human capital investment in (1.2.9). This
market-feedback benefit of human capital investment is typically ignored in individual
optimization but recognized in government optimization.
Further, in all these tables with compulsory individual savings, the level of aggre-
gate physical capital is increasing with the rate of survival, until the survival rate is
already very high. The key driving force for this is the positive response of life-cycle
savings to enhanced survival to old age, as seen in (1.2.6), against a negative response
of accidental bequests to enhanced survival. Intuitively, the weaker the willingness for
intertemporal substitution (larger σ), the weaker the response of life-cycle savings to a
rise in the survival rate. Indeed, even when the survival rate is as high as 0.9, the only
exception whereby the accumulation of physical capital falls with the survival rate is
found in Table 4 with a much reduced intertemporal substitution. In this exceptional
case, the slight decline in physical capital accumulation occurs when the decline in ac-
cidental bequests caused by enhanced survival to old age outweighs the rise in life-cycle
savings. Because of the positive effects of rising survival rates on human and physical
capital accumulations outside the rare exception, the growth rate of output per worker is
increasing with the rate of survival in both the short and long run in Tables 1 to 4 in the
absence of unfunded social security.
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1.3 Unfunded Social Security with Annuity Payment
Unfunded or pay-as-you-go social security has been instituted in many countries and has
been studied in a large body of literature. This paper revisits it with heterogenous agents
caused by different family mortality histories that lead to different amounts of accidental
bequests in the absence of private annuity markets. The main purpose is to compare it
with the compulsory individual saving scheme so as to investigate whether the recent
social security reform proposals are justifiable in this model. Because compulsory indi-
vidual savings should be inframarginal and neutral as shown earlier, the task at hand is
essentially to examine whether the unfunded public annuity scheme for the elderly can
improve welfare for the majority of voters in the initial period it is instituted. Doing so
is particularly relevant, both theoretically and practically, when the wage growth rate is
lower than the interest rate.
Again, we characterize the solution implicitly in two stages. In the first stage, each
worker chooses life-cycle savings to maximize utility in (1.1.1) subject to
c j1,t = (1 + rt)b
j
t + (1 − τt − ηt)wt − s jt , (1.3.1)




1 − p , (1.3.2)
where ηt denotes the contribution rate for unfunded social security and the last term on
the right-hand side of (1.3.2) is the equal amount of pooled public annuity payment from
a pay-as-you-go pension. When the contribution rate is defined as a constant ηt = η for
all t such that ηt = ηt+1, the return on the contribution to this unfunded program is equal
to (wt+1/wt)/(1 − p), i.e. the wage growth rate divided by the rate of survival. The
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amount of the aggregate bequest is determined according to bt = pkt in all periods. The
saving function is found to be
s jt =
(1 − p)[δ(1 − p)(1 + rt+1)]1/σ[(1 + rt)b jt + (1 − τt − η)wt] − wt+1ηt+1
(1 − p) {1 + rt+1 + [δ(1 − p)(1 + rt+1)]1/σ} (1.3.3)
which is increasing with bequests and decreasing with social security contributions and
benefits. Summing over it leads to the aggregate level of savings and the aggregate stock
of physical capital for the next period:
kt+1 = (1 + rt)btdt+1 + s0t , (1.3.4)
where s0t can be found from (1.3.3) by setting b
j
t = 0. The evolution of the aggregate
bequest is given by bt+1 = pkt+1 = p(1 + rt)btdt+1 + ps0t . The accumulation of human
capital follows equation (1.1.2).
In the second stage, the government chooses (ηt, τt) to maximize the utility of type-0
workers, knowing the saving function of workers and considering the market feedbacks.
In addition, we assume that the contribution rate is constant ηt = η over time in the spirit
of a “defined contribution” scheme. It leads to the following optimal conditions:
(c01,t)













, for t = 0, (1.3.5)
(c01,t)










+ φq−σt wt. (1.3.6)
When t > 0, ηt = η∗ as determined in the initial period (time 0). The evolution of the
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physical to human capital ratio is
µt+1Aταt [D(1 − θ)]αµαθt ht = (1 + rt)pktdt+1 + s0t (1.3.7)
which, together with the interest rate equation, can lead to the derivatives of
(µt+1, rt+1,wt+1) with respect to (η, τt), respectively. These conditions implicitly char-
acterize the solutions for (η, τt, bt+1, ht+1, kt+1, µt+1, rt+1,wt+1) for t ≥ 0, given the initial
stocks (h0, k0) that determine (r0,w0, b0, µ0).
Before presenting the numerical results, we give the following analytical results:
Proposition 1.3 For σ = 1, the economy with unfunded social security that pays annuity
benefits is globally convergent to a unique balanced growth path.
Proof. For log utility, the solutions for (τ, η) are time invariant and are implicitly deter-
mined by the following two equations:
[1 + δ(1− p)]{θ(1 − p)[1 + δ(1 − p)] + η(1 − θ)}2[θp + (1 − θ)(1 − τ − η)]
−δ(1 − p)(1 − θ)2(1 − τ − η){θ(1 − p)[1 + δ(1 − p)] + η(1 − θ)}
{θ(1 − p)[1 + δ(1 − p)] + θp + (1 − θ)(1 − τ)} =
δ(1 − p)[1 + δ(1 − p)][θp + (1 − θ)(1 − τ − η)]2
{θ(1 − p)[1 + δ(1 − p)] + η(1 − θ)} − δ(1 − p)(1 − θ)η
{θ[1 + δ(1 − p)] + 1 − θ}[θp + (1 − θ)(1 − τ − η)]
{θ(1 − p)[1 + δ(1 − p)] + θp + (1 − θ)(1 − τ)}, (1.3.8)
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(1 − τ− η)[φ + αδ(1 − p)(1 − θ)]{θ(1 − p)[1 + δ(1 − p)] + (1 − θ)η}2 −
δτ(1 − p)(1 − θ)2(1 − τ − η){θ(1 − p)[1 + δ(1 − p)] + (1 − θ)η} =
δτ(1 − p)[1 + δ(1 − p)][θp + (1 − θ)(1 − τ − η)]{θ(1 − p)[1 + δ(1 − p)] +
(1 − θ)2η} − δη(1 − p)[φ + αδ(1 − p)(1 − θ)][θp + (1 − θ)(1 − τ − η)]
{θ(1 − p)[1 + δ(1 − p)] + (1 − θ)η} − δτη(1 − p)(1 − θ)2
[θp + (1 − θ)(1 − τ − η)]. (1.3.9)
Denote the solution by (τ∗, η∗). The uniqueness of the solution follows the features of
the model: The feasible sets under the constraints are convex and compact; and the
log utility function and Cobb-Douglas functions in production and education are strictly
increasing, strictly concave and differentiable (hence continuous too). The ratio of phys-
ical to human capital evolves according to
µt+1 =
Dδθ(1 − p)2[θp + (1 − θ)(1 − τ∗ − η∗)]
A(τ∗)α[D(1 − θ)]α{θ(1 − p)[1 + δ(1 − p)] + (1 − θ)η}µ
θ(1−α)
t . (1.3.10)
As in the proof of Proposition 1.2, the economy with unfunded social security converges
globally to its balanced growth path with µ∞ > 0. Q.E.D.
We now compare the unfunded scheme with the compulsory individual saving scheme
or with no-government intervention in retirement income security. One major difference
between the compulsory individual saving and the pay-as-you-go system is the way to
distribute the saving of individuals who fail to survive to the old age. In the compul-
sory individual saving scheme, such saving is passed on to the children as bequest while
in the pay-as-you-go system, such saving is distributed among the surviving old, which
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would reduce the income inequality and benefit the type-0 agents. However, on the other
hand, the contribution to the pay-as-you-go system does not enter the physical capital
investment. Thus the wage rate in the pay-as you-go system will grow slower than in
the compulsory saving scheme.
Proposition 1.4 For σ = 1, if the rate of survival is sufficiently low and the taste for old-
age consumption is sufficiently strong, then the unfunded social security scheme with
public annuity benefits can yield higher welfare for type-0 workers in the initial period
of instituting this scheme, even when the wage growth rate is lower than the interest
rate.
Proof. From the optimal condition associated with voluntary savings s00 in (1.2.5) and
with the contribution for unfunded social security in (1.3.6), their marginal costs are the
same (c01,0)
−σ, while the marginal benefit of the latter is greater than that of the former,
















> 1 + r1 (1.3.11)
given initial stocks (h0, k0) that determine (r0,w0, µ0). The left-hand side is the rate of
return on contributions to the unfunded social security scheme, whereas the right-hand
side is the rate of return on voluntary or compulsory individual savings. We derive
conditions at η = 0 under which the inequality in (1.3.11) holds for p ∈ (0, 1), even
when w1/w0 < 1 + r1.
At η = 0, the third term on the left-hand side is equal to zero. For σ = 1, the
first term is positive because ∂r1/∂η > 0, which can be derived by noting ∂r1/∂η =
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−θ(1 − θ)Dµθ−21 ∂µ1/∂η and then using (1.3.10) for ∂µ1/∂η < 0 given µ0. Consequently,
the inequality in (1.3.11) holds for w1/w0 < 1 + r1 as long as 1 + r1 − w1/[w0(1 − p)] <
(s00/w0)∂r1/∂η. In fact, (1.3.11) will hold for σ = 1 if p and δ are sufficiently large such
that the positive term w1/[w0(1 − p)] alone dominates 1 + r1 at η = 0. Specifically, at
η = 0 and σ = 1 we have w1/[w0(1 − p)(1 + r1)] = µ1h1/[(1 − p)θDµθ0h0] = µ1Aτα0 (1 −
θ)αDα/[(1 − p)θDµθ(1−α)0 ] using (1.1.8), (1.1.9), (1.1.6) and (1.1.2). Inserting (1.3.10)
into this expression for substitution leads to w1/[w0(1 − p)(1 + r1)] = δ[θp + (1 − θ)(1 −
τ∗0)]/{θ[1 + δ(1 − p)]}, which approaches δ[θ + (1 − θ)(1 − τ∗0)]/θ as p → 1. This
limit δ[θ + (1 − θ)(1 − τ∗0)]/θ for w1/[w0(1 − p)(1 + r1)] can exceed unity, implying
w1/[w0(1− p)] > 1+r1, when δ is sufficiently large (say δ→ 1). Here, we have 0 < τ∗0 <
1 as p → 1 at η = 0 (hence back to the no-government case or the compulsory saving
case), according to (1.2.14). When δ is much smaller than unity, this limit expression
can still exceed unity for a value of the share parameter θ associated with physical capital
in production in the standard range of 1/4–1/3 and for a usual range of τ below 10%.
Note that w1/[w0(1 − p)] > 1 + r1 can co-exist with w1/w0 < 1 + r1. Therefore, even
when the wage growth rate is lower than the interest rate, unfunded social security with
pooled annuity payment can still improve welfare for sufficiently low survival rates and
a sufficiently strong taste for old-age consumption. Q.E.D.
The reasons for Proposition 4 are as follows. First, the public annuity return is
adjusted above the wage growth rate by the reciprocal of the rate of survival. When the
survival rate is low enough and when the taste for old-age consumption is strong enough,
the annuity rate of return on the unfunded social security scheme can be higher than
the interest rate. This return dominance tends to favor the unfunded scheme against the
compulsory individual saving scheme in welfare ranking. Second, when unfunded social
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security reduces voluntary savings, it raises the interest rate because of the tendency
of diminishing marginal products. This positive market feedback in the interest rate
tends to reduce the loss in utility caused by unfunded social security through depressing
voluntary savings. However, by reducing voluntary savings, unfunded social security
also tends to reduce the wage growth rate, thereby tending to cut the welfare gain from
the unfunded scheme.
At the starting point when raising the contribution rate for unfunded social security
from zero, the negative wage growth feedback effect has a zero weight at η = 0, but
the positive interest rate feedback effect has a positive weight. In this situation, a suf-
ficiently low survival rate and a sufficiently strong taste for old-age consumption will
render unfunded social security a return dominance over individual savings. This return
dominance leads to a welfare ranking in favor of the unfunded scheme against individ-
ual savings with or without the compulsory saving scheme. Thus, at this starting point
the net marginal benefit of unfunded social security is positive for a sufficiently low rate
of survival and a sufficiently strong taste for old-age consumption, even when the wage
growth rate is below the interest rate. However, when the contribution rate becomes
higher, the weight on the negative wage growth feedback effect, η/[w0(1− p)], becomes
larger, while the weight on the positive interest rate feedback effect, s00/w0, becomes
smaller. We thus expect that the optimal contribution rate is positive but bounded above.
These opposing market feedback effects and their impacts on the welfare assessment of
unfunded social security are novel contributions to the understanding of social security,
to the best of our knowledge. In addition, when the survival rate rises, the return dom-
inance of the unfunded scheme diminishes, implying that the optimal contribution rate
may be negatively associated with rising longevity.
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The numerical results are reported in Tables 1 to 4 under the case title ‘unfunded
scheme’. When the survival rate rises from 0.5 to 0.9, the response of the optimal
contribution rate for unfunded social security varies across Tables 1 to 4. In Table 1
with log utility, this contribution rate first rises with the survival rate and then falls
slightly at very high survival rates. In Table 2 through to 4, the rise in the survival rate
leads to declines in the social security contribution rate (down to zero in Tables 3 and
4 with very high survival rates). The changes causing this decline are the decrease in
the intertemporal substitution (between Tables 1 and 2) and the increase in the role of
physical capital in production (between Tables 1 and 3). The substantial decrease in
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution from unity reflects a significant decrease in
the willingness of sacrificing current consumption, either via unfunded social security
contributions or via life-cycle savings, for future consumption in old age. The increase
in the role of physical capital in production raises the interest rate in favor of individual
savings against unfunded social security, other things being equal.
1.4 Numerical Comparison Among Different Programs
When comparing capital accumulation, growth and type-0 workers’ welfare by numer-
ical simulation across regimes with different retirement income security schemes, we
reach some interesting observations that we highlight below, given the parameteriza-
tions in Section 1.2 and 1.3.
Numerical result 1.1 The unfunded public annuity scheme may lead to higher growth
rates of output per worker than the compulsory individual saving scheme in the short
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run or in the long run, when the share parameter of physical capital in production is
large and when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low.
The result that unfunded social security may lead to faster capital accumulation and
growth than the compulsory individual saving scheme is interesting compared to the typ-
ical results in the literature in life-cycle models. In a conventional neoclassical growth
model with physical capital through life-cycle savings and without human capital, un-
funded social security is typically regarded as harmful for life-cycle savings and growth;
see e.g. Feldstein (1974). This conventional implication of unfunded social security for
life-cycle savings and physical capital accumulation is echoed consistently in Tables 1
to 4 as the unfunded public annuity scheme yields lower physical capital accumulation
than the compulsory individual savings scheme.
With human and physical capital accumulation and with endogenous growth, it is
also typical in the literature that unfunded social security reduces human capital invest-
ment and the growth rate of output per worker provided fertility is exogenous as in this
model. This is because the payroll tax for unfunded social security reduces the after-tax
return on human capital investment as shown in Zhang (1995). However, in our model
with public schooling, it is the government, not individuals, that makes the decision of
education spending, taking into account the feedback effects from prices. Thus, in our
model the level of education spending may be lower or higher with unfunded social
security than without. In Tables 1 and 3 with log utility, the tax rates for public school-
ing are lower with unfunded social security than without, whereas the opposite holds
in Tables 2 and 4 with intertemporal substitution less than proportional. The result that
the tax rate for public schooling is higher with unfunded social security than without is
most pronounced in Table 4 with a large share parameter of physical capital θ and a low
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elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/σ. When the survival rate equals 0.7 in Table
4, the higher tax rate for public schooling with the unfunded scheme leads to a higher
growth rate in output per worker than the compulsory individual saving scheme in both
the short run and the long run, despite a negative effect of unfunded social security on
life-cycle saving and hence on physical capital accumulation.
We now switch to the welfare comparison:
Numerical result 1.2 The unfunded public annuity scheme leads to higher levels of
welfare for type-0 workers than the compulsory saving scheme until the survival rate is
very high.
Interestingly, in all Tables 1 to 4, unfunded social security with annuity benefits
leads to higher levels of welfare for type-0 workers in the initial period than the com-
pulsory individual saving scheme, until the survival rate becomes very high in Tables 3
and 4. Because the compulsory individual savings scheme is inframarginal and equiv-
alent to the original case without any government intervention for retirement concerns,
the unfunded program is welfare improving to type-0 workers when starting from this
original case as well. This welfare enhancing result even holds in Tables 2 and 4 where
the altruism toward child education is very weak φ = 0.005, as opposed to the result in
Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) that requires this altruism to be strong enough for welfare
improvements in the long run.
In reaching this welfare improving result, the parameterizations in Tables 1 and 2
share two favorable features: A > D and θ = 0.28. Both features are conducive to
wage growth relative to the interest rate, while maintaining the starting situation with a
higher interest rate than the wage growth rate. Because of these features, the contribu-
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tion rate for the unfunded public annuity scheme remains high even when the survival
rate reaches 0.9. Without these two features, in Tables 3 and 4 we still maintain the con-
clusion that the unfunded social security scheme with annuity payment provides type-0
workers with higher welfare than the compulsory individual saving scheme until the
survival rate becomes very high. This is true despite much more reduced optimal con-
tribution rates for unfunded social security in Tables 3 and 4 than in Tables 1 and 2.
Overall, the results cast serious doubt on the proposals that call for replacing unfunded
social security with the compulsory, individually-based saving schemes.
The welfare improvement by the unfunded public annuity scheme hinges on the
unique feature of the model: oversavings in the absence of private annuity markets and
in the presence of accidental bequests. Given that accidental bequests are unintended
in nature, it is a waste to individual savers to the extent of an expected chance of death
before entering old age. Pay-as-you-go social security with annuity payments reduces
savings and thus mitigates the oversaving problem for welfare gains.
We should also keep in mind that old-age agents are important in forming majority
support for any of these programs. Given the mass of the voting population as 1 + 1− p,
the elderly population has a mass 1 − p that is equal to the mass of type-0 working
population. For p ≤ 1/2, the elderly and type-0 workers are the largest groups indi-
vidually compared to any other group by type in the voting population, and together
they form a majority of the entire heterogeneous voting population. When taking into
account the attitudes of the whole voting population toward the different programs, the
comparison becomes more relevant. In particular, note that the elderly prefer the un-
funded or pay-as-you-go scheme to the compulsory individual saving scheme because
they can receive a government transfer from workers under the former scheme. Thus,
26
the compulsory individual savings scheme is less favorable to both type-0 workers and
the elderly than the unfunded scheme for plausible survival rates and parameterizations.
If choosing between the compulsory individual saving scheme and the unfunded pub-
lic annuity scheme via majority voting as in the case of the New Zealand referendum
in 1997, our model can explain why the majority voted for maintaining the unfunded
public annuity scheme in the referendum. In addition, it explains why a more recent
reform attempt at a partial switch from unfunded social security to compulsory private
savings in the US also failed to gather popular support. Overall, the result is consistent
with the fact that most of the developed countries have maintained their pay-as-you-go
or unfunded social security programs with rare exception like Australia.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper without private annuity markets, we have compared the reform-favored
compulsory individual savings scheme with the unfunded social security scheme. We
have found some interesting results. First, compulsory individual savings should be
inframarginal, indeterminate and neutral. Thus, equilibrium solutions with or without
compulsory individual savings should be the same. Second, the unfunded social security
scheme with annuity benefits provides workers without receiving accidental bequests
with higher welfare than the compulsory individual savings scheme, unless the survival
rate becomes too high and the taste for old-age consumption is too weak; it may also
lead to faster growth in output per worker. For some parameterizations, the optimal con-
tribution rate for the unfunded scheme is decreasing with the rate of survival; however,
for some parameterizations there is no such a declining trend.
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Our result differs from the literature in some important ways. It is valid in all pe-
riods including the initial period in the comparison between the compulsory individual
savings scheme and the unfunded public annuity scheme, in contrast to Cooley and
Soares (1999) that does not explain why unfunded social security is welfare improving
in the initial period. And it is valid even when the altruism toward child education is
very weak, in contrast to Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) that requires the altruism to-
ward child education to be strong enough for the welfare improvement in the long run
(unclear in the short run). Overall, the results in this paper cast doubt on the reform pro-
posals promoting the compulsory individual savings in a model with life-cycle savings,
accidental bequests and heterogeneous agents. Finally, our results complement those
from models with intended bequests and with private annuity markets.
Appendix
Calibrations
The common parameterization in Tables 1 to 4 is given by α = 0.2, δ = 0.45, h0 = 1,
and k0 = 0.15. Also, the length of one period corresponds to 25 years. Here, α = 0.2
is based on the belief that education is less physical capital intensive than production;
δ = 0.45 approximates an annual rate of time preference 3.2% for a period of 25 years.
The values of A and D are non-essential themselves, and are chosen to deliver an annual
rate of growth in output per worker in the plausible range of 2%–4%. However, the gap
between the values of A and D may be important in determining the gap between the
wage growth rate and the interest rate that determine the respective returns on contribu-
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tions to unfunded social security and to compulsory individual savings. Moreover, the
value of the rate of survival 1 − p is assumed to rise from 0.5 to 0.9 in order to capture
the demographic feature in developed countries from recent toward future times.
The value of the share parameter associated with physical capital in final production
is important in the determination of the marginal product of physical capital or the return
on individual savings. It may thus influence our numerical results. We assume θ = 0.28
in Tables 1 and 2 and raise it to θ = 0.36 in Tables 3 and 4. It is interesting to see how
sensitive our results are to such a variation in the value of θ.
The value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is potentially critical to our
results. We set its reciprocal either at σ = 1 in Tables 1 and 3 (log utility or propor-
tional intertemporal substitution), or at σ = 2 in Tables 2 and 4 (less than proportional
intertemporal substitution, regarded as more plausible in macroeconomic models). As is
standard in the literature on economic growth, the stronger the willingness for intertem-
poral substitution (smaller σ), the higher the growth rate, other things being equal. In
order to keep the growth rate in the same plausible range to accommodate such a large
variation in the value of σ, we also assign different values to the taste for the average
school quality: φ = 0.04 in Tables 1 and 3 and φ = 0.005 in Tables 2 and 4. Another
reason for assigning these different values to φ is to deliver a plausible ratio of public
education spending to output which is around 5% in developed countries (i.e. the tax
rate on labor income for school funding around 7%). Furthermore, it is interesting to see
whether the results are sensitive to the variation in the value of φ. In particular, we want
to know whether unfunded social security can raise welfare when the altruism toward
child education is very weak, because it needs to be strong enough for such a result in
the long run in Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999).
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For each value of the rate of survival 1 − p in Tables 1 to 4, the first reported case,
called ‘individual account’, corresponds to the compulsory individual saving scheme in
this section. Starting from an initial period (time 0), we solve and report the numerical
solutions for the compulsory saving rate (η), the tax rate for public schooling (τ), the
level of human capital for the next period (h1), the level of physical capital for the next
period (k1), the annual growth rate of output per worker in the initial period, the welfare
level of type-0 workers in the initial period, and the long-run growth rate of output
per worker, respectively. In computing all the results, we have gone through the entire
convergence process toward the balanced growth path, which usually takes 10 periods
to accomplish.
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Table 1 Results with different social security programs (σ = 1, low θ)
α = 0.2, δ = 0.45, φ = 0.04, D = 3, A = 4.6, θ = 0.28, σ = 1, h0 = 1, k0 = 0.15
Casesa tax for tax for human physical output welfare output
social public capital capital growth in time growth
security school in time in time in time 0b in long
(η, %) (τ, %) 1 (h1) 1 (k1) 0 (%) run (%)
survival rate 1 − p = 0.5
individual account − 6.22 2.769 0.264 3.63 −0.1303 4.02
unfunded scheme 8.02 5.79 2.729 0.184 3.17 −0.0984 3.86
survival rate 1 − p = 0.6
individual account − 6.67 2.808 0.294 3.80 −0.1485 4.11
unfunded scheme 8.51 6.16 2.763 0.212 3.37 −0.1173 3.95
survival rate 1 − p = 0.7
individual account − 7.12 2.845 0.318 3.93 −0.1611 4.18
unfunded scheme 8.73 6.54 2.797 0.236 3.53 −0.1319 4.03
survival rate 1 − p = 0.8
individual account − 7.57 2.880 0.337 4.03 −0.1684 4.25
unfunded scheme 8.71 6.94 2.830 0.257 3.66 −0.1421 4.10
survival rate 1 − p = 0.9
individual account − 8.04 2.914 0.351 4.11 −0.1705 4.30
unfunded scheme 8.49 7.37 2.864 0.275 3.78 −0.1476 4.16
Notes: a. ‘individual account’: inframarginal compulsory savings in individual accounts;
‘unfunded scheme’: unfunded and pooled public annuity program. The reported figures
here correspond to those maximizing the welfare of workers who receive no accidental
bequests. b. The welfare level also refers to workers who receive no accidental bequests’.
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Table 2 Results with different social security programs (σ = 2, low θ)
α = 0.2, δ = 0.45, φ = 0.005, D = 3, A = 4.6, θ = 0.28, σ = 2, h0 = 1, k0 = 0.15
Casesa tax for tax for human physical output welfare output
social public capital capital growth in time growth
security school in time in time in time 0b in long
(η, %) (τ, %) 1 (h1) 1 (k1) 0 (%) run (%)
survival rate 1 − p = 0.5
individual account − 7.18 2.849 0.254 3.67 −1.3109 4.09
unfunded scheme 6.90 7.17 2.848 0.160 3.13 −1.2749 3.92
survival rate 1 − p = 0.6
individual account − 7.29 2.858 0.268 3.74 −1.3636 4.12
unfunded scheme 6.80 7.37 2.865 0.179 3.28 −1.3334 3.98
survival rate 1 − p = 0.7
individual account − 7.39 2.866 0.277 3.79 −1.4116 4.14
unfunded scheme 6.43 7.61 2.882 0.197 3.41 −1.3874 4.04
survival rate 1 − p = 0.8
individual account − 7.49 2.874 0.281 3.82 −1.4551 4.16
unfunded scheme 5.84 7.86 2.902 0.211 3.51 −1.4368 4.09
survival rate 1 − p = 0.9
individual account − 7.60 2.882 0.283 3.83 −1.4946 4.17
unfunded scheme 5.05 8.15 2.922 0.223 3.60 −1.4814 4.13
Notes: a. ‘individual account’: inframarginal compulsory savings in individual accounts;
‘unfunded scheme’: unfunded and pooled public annuity program. The reported figures
here correspond to those maximizing the welfare of workers who receive no accidental
bequests. b. The welfare level also refers to workers who receive no accidental bequests’.
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Table 3 Results with different social security programs (σ = 1, high θ)
α = 0.2, δ = 0.45, φ = 0.04, D = 3.6, A = 3.6, θ = 0.36, σ = 1, h0 = 1, k0 = 0.15
Casesa tax for tax for human physical output welfare output
social public capital capital growth in time growth
security school in time in time in time 0b in long
(η, %) (τ, %) 1 (h1) 1 (k1) 0 (%) run (%)
survival rate 1 − p = 0.5
individual account − 5.82 2.101 0.261 2.74 −0.2211 2.94
unfunded scheme 3.52 5.64 2.088 0.231 2.54 −0.2165 2.86
survival rate 1 − p = 0.6
individual account − 6.19 2.127 0.288 2.91 −0.2351 3.02
unfunded scheme 2.87 6.03 2.116 0.264 2.77 −0.2325 2.97
survival rate 1 − p = 0.7
individual account − 6.56 2.152 0.308 3.04 −0.2427 3.09
unfunded scheme 1.89 6.45 2.145 0.292 2.95 −0.2417 3.06
survival rate 1 − p = 0.8
individual account − 6.94 2.176 0.321 3.14 −0.2451 3.15
unfunded scheme 0.63 6.90 2.174 0.316 3.11 −0.2440 3.14
survival rate 1 − p = 0.9
individual account − 7.33 2.201 0.330 3.20 −0.2391 3.20
unfunded scheme 0.00 7.33 2.201 0.330 3.20 −0.2391 3.20
Notes: a. ‘individual account’: inframarginal compulsory savings in individual accounts;
‘unfunded scheme’: unfunded and pooled public annuity program. The reported figures
here correspond to those maximizing the welfare of workers who receive no accidental
bequests. b. The welfare level also refers to workers who receive no accidental bequests’.
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Table 4 Results with different social security programs (σ = 2, high θ)
α = 0.2, δ = 0.45, φ = 0.005, D = 3.6, A = 3.6, θ = 0.36, σ = 2, h0 = 1, k0 = 0.15
Casesa tax for tax for human physical output welfare output
social public capital capital growth in time growth
security school in time in time in time 0b in long
(η, %) (τ, %) 1 (h1) 1 (k1) 0 (%) run (%)
survival rate 1 − p = 0.5
individual account − 6.91 2.175 0.241 2.71 −1.4049 3.01
unfunded scheme 3.12 7.21 2.193 0.205 2.49 −1.3991 2.95
survival rate 1 − p = 0.6
individual account − 6.98 2.179 0.250 2.77 −1.4551 3.03
unfunded scheme 1.79 7.46 2.208 0.229 2.67 −1.4529 3.03
survival rate 1 − p = 0.7
individual account − 7.04 2.183 0.254 2.79 −1.4997 3.04
unfunded scheme 0.13 7.76 2.225 0.248 2.81 −1.4989 3.10
survival rate 1 − p = 0.8
individual account − 7.11 2.187 0.254 2.80 −1.5394 3.05
unfunded scheme 0.00 7.11 2.187 0.254 2.80 −1.5394 3.05
survival rate 1 − p = 0.9
individual account − 7.19 2.192 0.250 2.78 −1.5744 3.05
unfunded scheme 0.00 7.19 2.192 0.250 2.78 −1.5744 3.05
Notes: a. ‘individual account’: inframarginal compulsory savings in individual accounts;
‘unfunded scheme’: unfunded and pooled public annuity program. The reported figures
here correspond to those maximizing the welfare of workers who receive no accidental
bequests. b. The welfare level also refers to workers who receive no accidental bequests’.
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Chapter 2
Nonhomothetic Tastes and Structural
Change in an OLG Model of a Small
Open Economy
Introduction
The early multi-sector literature is mainly concerned with allocation and reallocation of
labor force over different groups of industries. The main conclusion by Clark (1951) is
“the movement of working population from agriculture to manufacture and from man-
ufacture to commerce and services.” Erich Gundlach (1994) has documented three styl-
ized facts of the service sector in the long run in growing economies: a rise in the relative
price of service, a rise in the employment share, and an invariant real output share of
service (the rise of nominal output share of service is rather clear).
A group of literature was developed to capture the structural change. Xu (1993)
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presents a neoclassical growth model with homothetic tastes of manufacture and service
sector. Although his results fit the empirical regularities, his model is rather simpli-
fied by assuming exogenous technical progress and exogenous saving rate. Echevarria
(1997) and Kongsamut et. al. (2001) allow for nonhomothetic tastes, also with exoge-
nous labor-augmenting technical progress. Echevarria further allows different sectoral
rates of technical progress in manufacture and service and provides empirical evidence
in support of non-homotheticity. Stokey (1988) allows for learning by doing in manu-
facturing but not in agriculture, so the relative price of manufactured goods declines over
time. Laitner (2000) uses an overlapping-generation model to discuss the transition from
agriculture to manufacturing with exogenous technological change. His model shows
that the operation of Engel’s law over agriculture and manufacture goods will lead to an
increase of a country’s average propensity to save.
The above papers assume technological progress to be exogenous or an external-
ity of production as learning by doing. However, considering the large share of R&D
investment in all developed economies and multinational corporations, a more incen-
tive driven R&D framework should be adopted. Meckl (2002) adopts the expanding
product-variety framework of Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), and
nonhomothetic tastes same as in Kongsamut et al. His paper assumes that the rate of
technological progress is the same across all sectors. Kapur (2004), which inspires the
current paper, modeled the endogenous growth of manufacture and service sectors with
nonhomothetic tastes (different from Meckl and Kongsamut), and expanding-product-
variety framework. His paper allows different sectoral productivity growth rates, which
leads to relative price changes that fit the empirical regularities better. Kapur (2007) fur-
ther extend the model by dividing service into progressive and asymptotically stagnant
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sub-sectors and assuming partially overlapping variety sets across the sub-sectors.
If we relax the definition of multi-sector to beyond agriculture, manufacture and ser-
vice, we see another group of literature concerning the possibility of multiple steady
states and sunspot equilibriums. Their results are helpful for the deriving of multi-
ple steady-states in our paper. Galor (1992) develops an overlapping-generation model
with two sectors: consumption good and investment good. He studies the conditions
for unique (global) or multiple (local) steady states in the multi-dimensional produc-
tion economy and shows that (similar to our results) the stability properties depend on
the relative capital intensities of the two sectors. Chatterjee, Cooper and Ravikumar
(1993) explore the possibility of sunspot equilibrium and endogenous cycles in a two-
sector overlapping-generations model with entry. They show the existence of multiple,
Pareto-ranked steady states and those stationary sunspot equilibria can be constructed
as a randomization of the multiple steady states. Farmer and Wendner (2003) consider
a two-sector growth model with heterogeneous capital, i.e., capital is produced in both
sectors. Their paper derives the conditions and stability properties of the steady state(s)
and the possibility of overshooting as well as of oscillating transition paths.
There are three common but important assumptions made in both Chapter 2 and 3.
First is the assumption of research and development and the expanding-product-variety
framework. In our models, the profit seeking R&D sector is an important factor be-
hind the fluctuations of the production sectors, the labor market as well as the trade
volumes. Secondly, we assume the consumers’ tastes toward manufacture goods and
service goods are nonhomothetic. This assumption is based on the fact that the real
personal consumption expenditures on manufacture goods and service goods in the past
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decade are not growing in proportion.1 Using the nonhomothetic assumption, we will
be able to explain the economic rationale behind the stylized facts of the shifting of
the output share and employment share between the manufacture and the service sector.
Our third assumption is to use a small open economy rather than a closed economy as
it will not only simplify the analytical results of the general equilibrium but also intro-
duce interesting features such as the trade surplus or deficit in the model. One problem
regarding the assumption of a small open economy is that if the steady-state growth
rate is positive, the small open economy may eventually expand to be a more influential
economy and no longer belongs to the category of small economy. Our argument is that
since capital flow is not restricted across borders, R&D progress in the sample economy
should be at the same pace as in the rest of the world. If the world economy and the
sample economy grow at the same rate, the size of the sample economy can still be
relatively small.
The above assumptions have not been adopted before in an overlapping generation
model, as far as we are aware. In addition to the technical interest, the use of OLG model
should help us to better understand the difference of the non-homothetic tastes and ho-
mothetic tastes in terms of savings and consumption behaviors. Section 1 provides the
model setups and some preliminary results. Section 2 solves the model and studies the
transitional dynamics using numerical simulations. A comparison between the homoth-
etic and nonhomothetic tastes model is also made. Finally, section 3 concludes.
1According to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis National Economic Accounts, from 2005 to
2009, the percentage change of personal spending on manufacture goods over the four years is 1.416%,




Similar to the infinite-horizon models of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991),
we adopt an expanding-product-variety framework. We assume there are two sectors in
the economy: Manufacture M and Service S . For each sector i = M or S , we use
Yi to denote the final production, Li the labor input, Di the composite of intermediate
inputs, and Xi j the amount of intermediate good j employed in sector i. nt denotes the
measure of varieties of intermediate inputs available, which could grow over time as a
result of technological progress. The expanding of the varieties of intermediate goods
will lead to growth in output levels, income levels and consumption levels. Since we
have two final good sectors, the growth rate for each sector is not necessarily equal.
Thus for convenience, we define economic growth rate as the growth rate of the number
of intermediate goods: Gt ≡ nt+1/nt. The evolution of nt will be discussed in the R&D
section. For simplicity, we assume identical forms of Di in both sectors. β and θ below
stand the intensity of intermediate goods in the final production of Manufacture and
Service. Assuming service is more labor-intensive than manufacture, we have θ < β.










1/α, 0 < α < 1 (2.1.2)
YS t = AS L1−θS t D
θ
S t, 0 < θ < β (2.1.3)






Use w to denote wage rate and Pi the price of good i, Pd the price of composite input
D. We assume firms in both manufacture and service sector are competitive in output




, Pdt = Pit
∂Yit
∂Dit
Let AM = (1 − β)β−1β−β and AS = (1 − θ)θ−1θ−θ, we can derive the price of the
manufacture and service goods as well as the demands for labor and intermediate goods


























Let P j denote the price of intermediate good j, we have:




























Producers of intermediate goods are assumed to be monopolistically competitive
and the production for each unit of X j requires one unit of labor input. The following
equation also states the market-clearing condition for all X j.






dt (DMt + DS t) (2.1.11)
The profit of an intermediate producer is
pi jt = (P jt − wt)X jt
Use (2.1.11), the profit-maximizing price charged for X jt is P jt = wt/α. Again, since



































































(βPMtYMt + θPS tYS t) (2.1.15)
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In a small open economy, we assume manufacture goods are tradable and capital can
move across borders in the form of ownership claims on firms producing intermediate
goods. Service goods, intermediate goods and labor are nontradable. YM is a homo-
geneous good, and its production function is changing over time as technology level
improves. We let M be the numeraire (PMt ≡ 1). Equation (2.1.13) is consistent with
the fact that countries with higher technology level have higher labor income. Equation
(2.1.14) is coping with the first stylized fact by Erich Gundlach (1994) such that in the
long run in growing economies, relative price of services will rise.
Proposition 2.1 The growth rate of the number of variety of intermediate goods is Gt.
The growth rate of real wage (wt+1/wt) equals to G
(1−α)β
α
t . The growth rate of relative




The proof is obvious from equation (2.1.13) and (2.1.14).
Consumers
We use an OLG model with nonhomothetic tastes framework. In each period we as-
sume one representative agent is born. Each agent lives for two periods: works at the
young stage and retires at the old stage. Agents have nonhomothetic preferences towards
manufacture goods and service goods. For agent who was born at time t, Ci1t denotes
consumption of good i at time t, when she is young; and Ci2t+1 denotes consumption at
time t + 1 when she is old. st is her saving at young stage, the rate of return is at interest
rate (1 + r), which is determined by the world market and assumed to be constant. We
use ρ as the rate of time preference. The life time utility function for agent born at time
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t is:
Ut = ln(CM1t +C¯M)+τln(CS 1t +C¯S )+
1
1 + ρ
[ln(CM2t+1+C¯M)+τln(CS 2t+1+C¯S )] (2.1.16)
C¯M and C¯S are parameters. If C¯i = 0, the income elasticity of demand equals to unity
for good i. If C¯i < 0 (C¯i > 0), income elasticity is less (larger) than unity. We assume
service goods have higher income elasticity of demand than manufacture goods. To
simplify the model, we assume C¯S ≥ 0 and C¯M = 0.2 This specification includes the
special case when C¯S = 0, utility becomes homothetic. The budget constraints for agent
born at time t are:
CM1tPMt + CS 1tPS t + S t = wt (2.1.17)
CM2t+1PMt+1 + CS 2t+1PS t+1 = (1 + r)S t (2.1.18)
Or can be reduced to the following:
CM1tPMt + CS 1tPS t +
CM2t+1PMt+1 + CS 2t+1PS t+1
1 + r
= wt (2.1.19)
Use Lagrangian to solve the optimization problem, we have
Lt = Ut + λt[wt − (CM1tPMt + CS 1tPS t + CM2t+1PMt+1 + CS 2t+1PS t+11 + r )]
2In Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001), they assume income elasticity of demand is less than unity for
agricultural goods, unitary for manufacture good, and greater than unity for service goods. John Schmitt’s
DEMPATEM Working Paper NO.1 2004 provide empirical evidence of elastic demand for service based
on recent data.
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(1 + ρ)λtPS t+1
− C¯S (2.1.23)





(1 + τ)(2 + ρ)
[wt + C¯S (PS t +
PS t+1
1 + r
)] > 0 (2.1.24)
According to equation (2.1.24), it is necessary to assume perfect foresight for the con-
sumers. From the above, we can see that both CM1t and CM2t+1 are strictly positive.
However, in order to ensure that CS 1t and CS 2t+1 are also economically meaningful, we










(1 + ρ)C¯S PS t+1
(1 + r)τ
(2.1.26)
Together with (2.1.24), we have:
C¯S [(1 + r)(2 + τ + ρ)PS t − τ(1 + ρ)PS t+1] < (1 + r)τ(1 + ρ)wt (2.1.27)
C¯S {[1 + (1 + τ)(1 + ρ)]PS t+1 − (1 + r)τPS t} < (1 + r)τwt (2.1.28)
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These above results will be applied in later sections.
Proposition 2.2 With technological progress, ratio of consumptions for manufacture
and service goods over wage income in the nonhomothetic system will be converging to
the ones in homothetic system.






















(1 + ρ)λtPS t+1wt
− C¯S
wt

























(1 + τ)(2 + ρ)
Intuitively, when nt grows, consumer’s budget will be raised. The differences in con-
sumption rates in homothetic case and nonhomothetic case will be less significant. 
By equation (2.1.24), we can compute the price elasticity of demand for service
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(wt + C¯S PS t+11+r )
τ(1+ρ)
(1+τ)(2+ρ)PS t
(wt + C¯S PS t+11+r ) − C¯S [1 − τ(1+ρ)(1+τ)(2+ρ) ]
> 1
since 1 > τ(1+ρ)(1+τ)(2+ρ) . The price elasticity of demand for service good for old generation is
also greater than unity, with similar proof.
R&D
The expanding-product-variety model presents technological improvements in terms of
increases in the measure of intermediate goods. Assume the number of the new inven-
tions is proportional to the exiting number of intermediate goods as well as the labor







The measure of intermediate goods is assumed to be nondecreasing over time. Since
we define Gt = nt+1/nt, it is not economically meaningful to have Gt < 1 in this model.
We assume the inventor of good j is also the producer. Once an intermediate good is
invented, the producer can enjoy monopoly profit in all the following periods. The profit
is shown by (2.1.15). R&D costs are financed by issuing equity. The value of equity for
each firm is denoted by ν, which also equals to the discounted value of the firms’ future
profits. The non-arbitrage condition holds:
pi jt+1 = (1 + r)ν jt − ν jt+1 (2.1.30)
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In a symmetric equilibrium, pi j = pi for all j. The free entry condition holds when
νt(nt+1 − nt) = wtLrt (2.1.31)









Proposition 2.3 With technological progress, the equilibrium discounted value of a
R&D firm’s future profit will increase if (1 − α)β/α > 1 and decrease if (1 − α)β/α < 1.
Proof. The investors’ incentives are driven by R&D firms’ future profit. By equation
(2.1.32) and Proposition 2.1, the growth rate of νt is G
(1−α)β
α −1
t . If Gt > 1, the discounted
value of the firms’ future profits will increase if (1 − α)β/α > 1 and decrease if (1 −
α)β/α < 1. We know the higher is α, the lower is the monopoly mark-up (the price of
intermediate good j is wt/α). When nt increases, wage income increases thus brings up
the demand for more intermediate goods. As a result of the free entry condition, more
firms enter the market and demand for each type of intermediate good will fall. Thus,
only when α is small or mark-up is high, firm’s future profit will rise with expanding
variety of intermediate goods. 
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Market-Clearing Conditions
For a small open economy, as earlier stated, we assume only manufacture goods can
be traded in the international market and only capital can move across borders. Service
goods, labor and intermediate goods can only be traded internally. The market-clearing
condition for each intermediate good is stated in equation (2.1.11). The service goods
and labor markets clear at:
YS t = CS 1t + CS 2t (2.1.34)
1 = LMt + LS t +
∫ nt
0
L jtd j + Lrt (2.1.35)
=
1 − β + αβ
wt
PMYMt +
1 − θ + αθ
wt




Bt denotes the trade surplus of manufacture sector:
Bt = (YMt −CM1t −CM2t)PM (2.1.36)
Balance of payments implies that net capital outflows equals to net exports plus net
income from investment abroad. S t denotes saving as defined in consumer’s problem.
Vt is defined as the investment in domestic market.
(S t − Vt) − (S t−1 − Vt−1) = r(S t−1 − Vt−1) + Bt (2.1.37)
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By Walras’ Law3, we can derive the equilibrium condition for the equity market:
Vt − (1 + r)Vt−1 = νtnt+1 − (1 + r)νt−1nt (2.1.38)
This implies that the increment in present value of total investment equals the increment
of total present value of the existing intermediate good. One logical solution for (2.1.38)
is
Vt = νtnt+1 (2.1.39)
such that the investment in time t equals to the total equities issued in time t to finance
the R&D.
2.2 Solve the Model
From (2.1.34), (2.1.36), and substitute (2.1.20)-(2.1.24) we have:
YMt =
γt
(1 + τ)(2 + ρ)
+ Bt (2.2.1)
PS tYS t =
τγt
(1 + τ)(2 + ρ)
− 2C¯S PS t (2.2.2)
Where




3Details in Appendix 2.1
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− (1 − β + αβ)YMt + (1 − θ + αθ)PS tYS t
µwt
(2.2.3)
pitnt = (1 − α)(βYMt + θPS tYS t) (2.2.4)
Together with (2.1.33) and substitute in (2.2.1) (2.2.2), we get:
Bt =
µ
(1 − α)β [(1 + r)wt−1Gt−1 − wt] −
(β + θτ)γt








− (β − θ)τγt
µβ(1 + τ)(2 + ρ)wt
− 1 − β + αβ
(1 − α)βwt [(1 + r)wt−1Gt−1 − wt] (2.2.6)
+
2(β − θ)C¯S PS t
µβwt
Substitute in (2.1.13) (2.1.14), the dynamic system of the model can be shown by the
following two equations. In (2.2.7), Bt/wt depends on Gt, Gt−1 and nt−1. In (2.2.8), Gt is
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(1 − α)β [(1 + r)G
1− (1−α)βα
t−1 − 1] (2.2.7)
− (β + θτ)




t−1 + (1 + ρ)]
+


















− 1 − β + αβ
(1 − α)β [(1 + r)G
1− (1−α)βα
t−1 − 1] (2.2.8)
− (β − θ)τ
















− (β − θ)τ(1 + ρ)C¯S







Also, by equation (2.1.27) and (2.1.28), we get the following constraints for C¯S :



















1 + (1 + τ)(1 + ρ)
(2.2.10)
To ensure the model is economically meaningful, we need PS tYS t ≥ 0 and YMt ≥ 0.
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−Gt) − 1 − β + αβ1 − α [(1 + r)G
1− (1−α)βα
t−1 − 1] ≥ 0 (2.2.11)
1 − θ + αθ
1 − α [(1 + r)G
1− (1−α)βα
t−1 − 1] − θ(
1 + µ
µ
−Gt) ≥ 0 (2.2.12)
The above conditions will be further explained in Appendix 2.2.
Homothetic Preferences






(1 − α)β [(1 + r)G
1− (1−α)βα
t−1 − 1] (2.2.13)
− (β + θτ)








− 1 − β + αβ
(1 − α)β [(1 + r)G
1− (1−α)βα
t−1 − 1] (2.2.14)
− (β − θ)τ




t−1 + (1 + ρ)]
By equation (2.2.13), if the wage rate wt grows over time, trade surplus Bt may not be
stationary when the growth rate Gt is constant.4 Bt is proportional to wt. The amount
of the international borrowing or lending of this economy will be a (fixed) portion of its
household income. At the steady-state, |Bt| is monotonically increasing as the number of
variety of intermediate goods grows. If Bt is positive at the steady-state, technological
progress will enlarge the volume of trade surplus. On the other hand, if Bt is negative,
4Buiter (1981) pointed out that the steady-state current account balance need not to be at equilibrium.
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higher technology level will lead to a larger trade deficit.




(1 − α)(β − θ)(1 + r)τ






(1 − β + αβ)[(1 − α)β − α](1 + r)





= − (1 − α)[α + (1 − α)β](β − θ)(1 + r)τ











According to the above, when α ≤ β/(1 + β), Gt will be a monotonically increas-
ing and concave function of Gt−1. When α > β/(1 + β), the Gt function will be non-
monotonic and concave when Gt−1 is small and becomes convex when Gt−1 increases.
The following figures plot Gt against Gt−1. Figure 1(a) and 1(b) give the examples of
α ≤ β/(1 + β) and α > β/(1 + β) respectively.5 In both figures, there are 2 intersections
of the Gt curve and the 45 degree line, which indicate the steady-states. If the inter-
section is below (above) 1, the growth rate (nt+1 − nt)/nt at the steady-state is negative
(positive). A negative steady-state is not economically meaningful in this model. The
positive steady-state is stable in Figure 1(a) but the stability for the positive steady-state
in Figure 1(b) is indeterminate. As suggested in Equation (2.2.15), stability of the state
is mostly affected by the scale of α and r. However, transitional dynamics are not nec-
essary in the homothetic case. If at time zero G0 is at the steady-state, all future Gt will
5For Figure 1(a) and 2(a), the parameter values are chosen as the following: r = 1, ρ = 1.2, τ = 5,
α = 0.2, β = 0.35, θ = 0.25 and µ = 0.1. For Figure 1(b) and 2(b), the parameter values are chosen as
the following: r = 1, ρ = 1.2, τ = 5, α = 0.4, β = 0.35, θ = 0.25 and µ = 0.1. Detailed discussion of
calibrations is in Appendix 2.2.
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stay at the steady state.
From (2.2.13) we can see when α ≤ β/(1 + β), Bt/wt will be a non-monotonic and
concave function of Gt−1. It will be downward slopping for Gt−1 ≥ 1. When α >
β/(1 + β), Bt/wt will be monotonically increasing. Figure 2(a) illustrates the case of
α ≤ β/(1 + β), and Figure 2(b) illustrates the case of α > β/(1 + β).
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The above figures are consistent with Proposition 2.1 and 2.3. Proposition 2.1 states
when α < β/(1 + β), real wage grows faster than the number of variety of intermediate
goods, or domestic supply grow slower than consumer’s demand, which suggests an
enlarging trade deficit. As shown in Figure 2(a), when Gt−1 ≥ 1, Bt/wt is downward
slopping. Proposition 2.3 states when α < β/(1+β), the increment of discounted value of
the future profit of a R&D firm is positively related to growth rate. Thus a higher growth
rate encourages higher R&D investment. Therefore, as shown in Figure 1(a), when
Gt−1 ≥ 1, Gt is an increasing function of Gt−1. Similarly, when α > β/(1+β), Proposition
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2.1 can explain the upward slopping curve of Bt/wt in Figure 2(b) and Proposition 2.3
explains the decreasing part of Gt when Gt−1 ≥ 1 in Figure 1(b).
Nonhomothetic Preferences
When C¯S > 0, consumers have nonhomothetic preferences towards manufacture and
service goods.
There exists a stationary steady-state of the nonhomothetic tastes model such that
Gt = 1 and the steady-state trade surplus Bt is constant. The stationary steady-state is
n =
{
(1 − α)(β − θ)C¯S {(2 + τ)(1 + r)(2 + ρ) − τ[(1 + r)2 + (1 + ρ)]}
αθ(1 + r){(1 − α)(β − θ)τ(2 + r + ρ) + (1 + τ)(2 + ρ)[µ(1 − β + αβ)r − (1 − α)β]}
} α
(1−α)θ
Besides the stationary steady-state, the system of nonhomothetic preference has an
asymptotic steady-state, which equals to the steady-state of the homothetic preference
case. Use equation (2.2.8), we get:
dGt
dGt−1
= {1 + (1 − α)(β − θ)








{ (1 − β + αβ)(β − α − αβ)(1 + r)




(1 − α)(β − θ)(1 + r)τ






(1 − α)(β − θ)(1 + r)τC¯S













(1 − α)(β − θ)θτ(1 + ρ)C¯S








Similar to the homothetic case, when α ≤ β/(1 + β) and nt−1 is large enough, the
nonhomothetic Gt will be a monotonically increasing function of Gt−1. Figure 3(a) and
3(b) plot Gt against Gt−1 with α ≤ β/(1 + β). In Figure 3(a), the Gt curve of the non-
homothetic case lies above the homothetic curve. In Figure 3(b), near the steady-state,
the nonhomothetic Gt lies below the homothetic curve. The difference is mainly due to
the gap between the labor intensity of the manufacture and the service sector, or equiv-
alently (β − θ). In Figure 3(a), (β − θ) is relatively small; while in Figure 3(b), (β − θ) is
relatively large.6 In both figures, we can see the Gt curve of nonhomothetic preference
case shifts closer to the homothetic case as nt−1 increases.
6For Figure 3(a), the parameter values are chosen as the following: r = 1, ρ = 1.2, τ = 5, α = 0.2,
β = 0.28, θ = 0.25, µ = 0.2 and C¯S = 250. The asymptotic steady-state is approximately 3.00419. For
Figure 3(b), the parameter values are chosen as the following: r = 1, ρ = 1.2, τ = 5, α = 0.25, β = 0.385,
θ = 0.1, µ = 0.1 and C¯S = 250. The asymptotic steady-state is approximately 4.70142.
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When α > β/(1 + β), the nonhomothetic Gt function is non-monotonic. Figure 3(c)
and 3(d) plot Gt against Gt−1 with α > β/(1 + β). In Figure 3(c), the Gt curve of the
nonhomothetic case lies above the homothetic curve. In Figure 3(d), near the steady-
state, the nonhomothetic Gt lies below the homothetic curve.7 Again, the Gt curve of
nonhomothetic preference case shifts closer to the homothetic case as nt−1 increases.
7For Figure 3(c), the parameter values are chosen as the following: r = 1, ρ = 1.2, τ = 5, α = 0.3,
β = 0.35, θ = 0.25, µ = 0.1 and C¯S = 250. The asymptotic steady-state is approximately 4.01447. For
Figure 3(d), the parameter values are chosen as the following: r = 1, ρ = 1.2, τ = 5, α = 0.4, β = 0.5,
θ = 0.1, µ = 0.03 and C¯S = 250. The asymptotic steady-state is approximately 10.6041.
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From Figure 3(a) to 3(d), we can see that all the nonhomothetic curves and homoth-
etic curve intersect at one point, which is:





The asymptotic steady-state of the nonhomothetic system is stable if the (absolute
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value of the) slope of the Gt(Gt−1) curve is less than 1 at the steady-state. Using numeri-
cal simulations, we are able to show that when the steady-state is stable, for a large range
of initial values of G0 and n0, the nonhomothetic system will converge to its asymptotic
steady-state. Note that periodic behavior is only possible if Gt can be less than 1, which
is not feasible in this model.
From numerical simulations, we have the following conclusions.
Numerical Result 2.1 When α ≤ β/(1+β), the nonhomothetic preference model will
converge to its asymptotic steady-state, which is the same as the homothetic steady-state.
During the convergence, the output share and the employment share of the manufacture
sector and service sector will shift and the trade volume will also fluctuate.
When α ≤ β/(1 + β), Gt(Gt−1) is upward slopping; When β/(1 + β) < α, Gt(Gt−1)
is downward slopping. To ensure the existence of a stable steady-state, the slope of
the Gt(Gt−1) curve should belong to (−1, 1). Figure 4(a) plots the example when the
nonhomothetic curve lies above the homothetic one.8 We assume the initial growth
rate is equal to the asymptotic steady-state value. As shown in the graph, the growth
rate will increase first, then gradually fall back to approach the asymptotic steady-state
level. Figure 4(b) further illustrates this process. The system starts on the curve of
nonhomothetic preference of n0. At the next stage, since growth rate is positive, the
system will land on a nonhomothetic curve with higher value of n. This curve, as shown
in Figure 3(a), should be closer to the homothetic preference curve. The system keeps
on shifting to curves with higher values of n and growth rate will fall and converge to
the asymptotic steady-state.
8For Figure 4(a), the parameter values are chosen as the following: r = 1, ρ = 1.2, τ = 5, α = 0.2,
β = 0.28, θ = 0.25, µ = 0.2 and C¯S = 250. The asymptotic steady-state is approximately 3.00419.
60
To explain the transitional dynamics in Figure 4(a), in Figure A1, Appendix 2.3,
we compare the homothetic system and the nonhomothetic systems. The two sys-
tems start at the same initial point of growth rate, number of variety of intermediate
goods and trade surplus. The dynamics can be explained by two effects. Firstly, by
the convergence path of the real value demand ratio of manufacture and service goods
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PS t(CS 1t + CS 2t)/(CM1t + CM2t), we know the relative demand for service in the nonho-
mothetic system is initially lower than the homothetic system level, and will gradually
raise to the asymptotic steady-state level. This can be explained by Proposition 2.2,
such that in the nonhomothetic case, consumption ratio for services will converge to the
homothetic level. Since the demand for service goods is increasing in the nonhomoth-
etic system, there is greater incentive to invest in R&D. Thus the nonhomothetic growth
rate is higher than the homothetic growth rate. In response to the change in demand,
producers will change the nominal output ratio PS tYS t/YMt and the employment share
of the service sector LS t. In Figure A1, after the initial jump, both the nominal output
ratio and the employment share of service for the nonhomothetic preferences rise to ap-
proach the steady-state values. Figure 1A also shows that the real output ratio YMt/YS t
for the nonhomothetic case is nonmonotonic, while for the homothetic case, the real
output share is decreasing over time. Trade deficit over income −Bt/wt is lower in the
nonhomothetic case than in the homothetic case because demand for manufacture shifts
to service and import is reducing. Also, less capitals flow out as there is higher demand
to finance the domestic R&D. Secondly, the expected future profit of the R&D firms, νt,
in both nonhomothetic and homothetic preferences are increasing over time. By Propo-
sition 2.3, when α ≤ β/(1+β), positive growth rate leads to higher expected future profit
of the R&D firms, which will encourage the R&D investment for the next period. Thus,
the nonhomothetic growth rate is always higher than the homothetic growth rate during
the transition. As nt increases, the positive effect of different propensity to consume
diminishes and the nonhomothetic growth rate Gt gradually falls back to the initial level
asymptotically.
The above result can be viewed as a growth version of the Keynesian Paradox of
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Thrift. In the nonhomothetic preference system, for G0 > 1, income will increase ini-
tially. Together with the increasing propensity to consume for services, producers have
incentive to expand the service sector through a higher investment in R&D. This will
lead to a higher growth rate in the next period. With nt rising faster, wage will also rise
faster, consumers thus can afford a higher consumption of services.
Figure 5(a) plots the example when the nonhomothetic curve lies below the homo-
thetic one.9 Similarly, we assume the initial G0 is at the steady-state value. As shown
in the graph, the growth rate will decrease first, then gradually rise back to approach the
original level. Figure 5(b) further illustrate the process.
9For Figure 5(a), the parameter values are chosen as the following: r = 1, ρ = 1.2, τ = 5, α = 0.25,
β = 0.385, θ = 0.1, µ = 0.1 and C¯S = 250. The asymptotic steady-state is approximately 4.70142.
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Figure 2A in Appendix 2.3 is used to compare the dynamics of the homothetic and
nonhomothetic systems in Figure 5(a). The two systems start from the same initial point.
As shown by the PS t(CS 1t + CS 2t)/(CM1t + CM2t) curve, relative demand for services
over manufacture in the nonhomothetic system is lower than the homothetic level and
is increasing over time. However, both the nominal output ratio PS tYS t/YMt and the
employment share of the service sector LS t in the nonhomothetic preferences falls (after
the initial jump up) to approach the homothetic level, and the import are also falling.
This means that resources have been transferring from service sector to manufacture
and R&D sector. In this case the gap between the labor intensities of the two sectors
(β− θ) is larger, and thus the service price grows faster. From previous section we know
that the price elasticity of demand for services is greater than 1. A fast growing service
price will discourage consumption for services. Investors have to raise their revenue
indirectly by expanding the R&D sector and increasing wage rate. Thus, the growth rate
in the nonhomothetic case drop first, then increases over time. From Figure 2A we can
also see that the real output shares for services in both nonhomothetic and homothetic
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systems are decreasing over time. Secondly, the expected future profit of the R&D firms
νt in both nonhomothetic and homothetic preferences are increasing over time, which
should encourage the R&D investment in future according to Proposition 2.3. As a result
of these two effects, the nonhomothetic growth rate is lower than the homothetic growth
rate during the transition. As nt increases, the negative effect of decreasing consumption
rate for service diminishes and the nonhomothetic growth rate Gt will rise to the initial
level.
Numerical Result 2.2 When α > β/(1 + β), if α is small enough and the initial
growth rate is close to the homothetic steady-state, the nonhomothetic preference model
will still converge to its asymptotic steady-state. During the convergence, the output
share and the employment share of the manufacture sector and service sector will shift
and the trade volume will also fluctuate. If α is too large, the nonhomothetic preference
model will not converge.
When α > β/(1 + β), the slope of the nonhomothetic curve (when crossing the 45
degree line) will be negative and steeper than 1 if α is large. The model tends to be
unstable and the growth rate might fall below 1, which is not economically feasible un-
der our assumptions. Figure 6 demonstrate the dynamics. Another parameter affecting
the slope of the Gt curve is r. Numerical simulation shows that when r is very small
(approximately zero, see Appendix 2), the Gt curve is flatter than the 45o line. However,
such value of r is not realistic. Intuitively, higher α, and a higher r, both tend to reduce
the profitability of investment, thus the growth rate can fall below 1. However, modern
economies are active in innovation and R&D, so the stable case with high innovation
and positive growth appears to be more economically relevant.
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When α is small enough, the nonhomothetic curve is flatter, the system may converge
to the asymptotic steady-state. Figure 7(a) shows the example when nonhomothetic
curve is above the homothetic curve.10 As illustrated in Figure 7(b), the growth rate will
jump up first then gradually fall back to the asymptotic steady-state level.
10For Figure 7(a), the parameter values are chosen as the following: r = 1, ρ = 1.2, τ = 5, α = 0.3,
β = 0.35, θ = 0.25, µ = 0.1 and C¯S = 250. The asymptotic steady-state is approximately 4.01447.
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Figure A3 in Appendix 2.3 compares the dynamics of nonhomothetic and homoth-
etic system. Both systems start from the same initial point. Since the gap between the
labor intensities of the two sectors (β − θ) is smaller in this case, PS t grows slower, in-
vestors can increase their revenue by expanding the service sector directly. The relative
demand for service goods in the nonhomothetic system is lower than in the homothetic
system initially, which lead to a higher saving and thus higher growth rate. The relative
demand of service then increases over time. As a result, the nominal output share and
employment share for services in the nonhomothetic system will also rise to approach
the homothetic level. R&D sector therefore has less input, and the growth rate of the
nonhomothetic system gradually falls back to the initial level. Since α > β/(1 + β),
by Proposition 2.3, high growth rate has a counteractive effect on next period. Among
the two effects, the effect of changing in demand of service is dominant and the growth
rate of the nonhomothetic rate is always above the homothetic level in the transitional
dynamics.
Figure 8(a) shows the example when nonhomothetic curve is above the homothetic
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curve but both curves are steeper.11 The growth rate of the nonhomothetic system will
jump up first then fluctuates below and above the asymptotic steady-state with decreas-
ing amplitudes.
11For Figure 8(a), the parameter values are chosen as the following: r = 1, ρ = 1.2, τ = 5, α = 0.3,
β = 0.3, θ = 0.25, µ = 0.1 and C¯S = 250. The asymptotic steady-state is approximately 2.97121.
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Figure 4A in Appendix 2.3 compares the dynamics of nonhomothetic and homoth-
etic system. Both systems start from the same initial point. Compare to the previous
case, the Gt curve is steeper. The counteractive effect of a higher growth rate on the
next period investment is stronger for α > β/(1 + β). Thus the growth rate of the non-
homothetic system will fluctuates below and above the asymptotic steady-state after the
initial jump up. In the nonhomothetic system, both the nominal and real output share
for services fluctuates. As nt increase, the effect of the changing in demand for service
diminished and the amplitudes of the fluctuation decreases.
Figure 9(a) shows the example when nonhomothetic curve is below the homothetic
curve.12 As illustrated in Figure 9(b), the growth rate will jump down first then gradually
rise back to the steady-state level.
12For Figure 9(a), the parameter values are chosen as the following: r = 1, ρ = 1.2, τ = 5, α = 0.4,
β = 0.5, θ = 0.1, µ = 0.03 and C¯S = 250. The asymptotic steady-state is approximately 10.6041.
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Figure 5A in Appendix 2.3 compares the dynamics of nonhomothetic and homo-
thetic system. Both systems start from the same initial point. Firstly, relative demand
for service in the nonhomothetic case is lower than in the homothetic case. Since the
gap between of labor intensities of the manufacture and the service sector (β − θ) is
large in this case, a fast growing PS t will discourage consumption for services as the
price elasticity of demand for services is greater than 1. In order to stimulate consump-
tion for service, investors will expand the R&D sector to increase the wage level. The
growth rate will then increase as well as the relative demand for services. However, to
finance the R&D, the manufacture sector also needs to expand in order to reduce the
trade deficit and increase the capital inflow. Thus, inputs are moving to the R&D sector
and manufacture sector. The nominal output share and employment share for services
in the nonhomothetic case will eventually decrease. Secondly, when α > β/(1 +β), high
growth rate has a counteractive effect on the growth rate next period. The first effect is
dominant in this case and the nonhomothetic growth rate will be below the homothetic
level. As nt increases, the effect of changing in demand for service will diminish and
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the nonhomothetic growth rate will rise and approaches the steady-state asymptotically.
Figure 10(a) shows the example when nonhomothetic curve is below the homothetic
curve with both curves steeper.13 As illustrated in Figure 10(b), the growth rate will
jump down first then fluctuates with diminishing amplitudes and eventually converge
to the steady-state. The n0 levels are chosen at a high level to show the fluctuations of
growth rate.
13For Figure 10(a), the parameter values are chosen as the following: r = 1, ρ = 1.2, τ = 5, α = 0.3,
β = 0.26, θ = 0.1, µ = 0.01 and C¯S = 250. The asymptotic steady-state is approximately 31.4028.
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Figure 6A in Appendix 2.3 compares the dynamics of nonhomothetic and homoth-
etic system. Both systems start from the same initial point. Compare to the previous
case, the Gt curve is steeper. Thus the counteractive effect of higher growth rate on the
next period is stronger, which result in the fluctuation of the nonhomothetic growth rate.
2.3 Conclusions
This paper compares the structural change in homothetic and nonhomothetic taste sys-
tems in a small open OLG model adopting an expanding product-variety framework.
We find that when the monopoly mark-up is high or when α is small (in our simulation
≤ 0.3), the nonhomothetic system is stable. Its asymptotic steady-state equals to the ho-
mothetic steady-state. As nt increases, the nonhomothetic case converges to the homoth-
etic case. The transition differs when α is below or above β/(1+β). When α ≤ β/(1+β),
the nonhomothetic growth rate converge monotonically towards the asymptotic steady-
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state. When α > β/(1 + β) but smaller than certain value, the nonhomothetic growth
rate will converge monotonically or fluctuates with decreasing amplitudes around the
asymptotic steady-state.
When the gap between the labor intensities of the manufacture sector and the ser-
vice sector is small, the nonhomothetic preference curve is above the homothetic curve.
Growth rate adjust in the opposite direction of relative demand of service over manu-
facture. As relative demand increases, since the price level for service grows slower,
investors can increase their revenue by expanding the service sector directly. Our nu-
merical results therefore fit the stylized facts of Erich Gundlach (1994). The relative
price of service will rise as the number of variety of intermediate goods grows. The
employment and nominal output share of service sector in the nonhomothetic case will
rise in the medium run. While in the homothetic case, the employment and nominal
output share are constant. The real output share for services in the nonhomothetic case
is nonmonotonic and in the homothetic case is always decreasing over time. We have
also shown that it is possible to have higher transitional growth rates. Higher growth rate
of wage will lead to higher demand for services which gives firms incentive to maintain
high investment in R&D while expanding the service sector. Thus the growth rate during
the transition is always higher than the steady-state level.
When the gap between the labor intensities of the manufacture sector and the service
sector is large enough, such parameter values may not be realistic, the nonhomothetic
preference curve is below the homothetic curve. Growth rate adjust in the same direc-
tion of relative demand of service over manufacture. Though relative demand increases,
but the aggregate consumption drops, investors have to expand the R&D sector and thus
raise the wage rate to stimulate consumptions. The relative price of service will still rise
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as the number of variety of intermediate goods grows. However, the employment, nom-
inal and real output share of the service sector in the nonhomothetic case will eventually
drop, as a result of a fast growing price level of the service. This case is different from
the Erich Gundlach’s stylized facts and thus is not empirically applicable.
We adopt an expanding-product-variety frame in an OLG model to the study of struc-
tural changes, which is the novel contribution of this paper to the best of our knowledge.
Various assumptions have been made to simplify the model. For example, service good
is set to be nontradable. Considering the large share of global outsourcing services, it
might be more realistic to divide service into tradable and nontradable sectors. More-
over, in the OLG framework, growth rate could fluctuate with large amplitudes, which
means dramatic adjustments in the R&D sector and is not empirically reasonable. On
the other hand, in an infinitely-lived representative agent model, growth rate should be
able to adjust much more smoothly. Thus, in Chapter 3 we will discuss this framework




Use (2.1.15), (2.1.17), (2.1.18), together with (2.1.34)-(2.1.36), we have
pi jtnt = (1 − α)(βPMYMt + θPS tYS t)
wt = (1 − β + αβ)PMYMt + (1 − θ + αθ)PS tYS t + νt(nt+1 − nt)
S t − (1 + r)S t−1 = wt + Bt − PMYMt − PS tYS t
= νt(nt+1 − nt) − (1 − α)(βPMYMt + θPS tYS t) + Bt
= νt(nt+1 − nt) − pi jtnt + Bt
Use (2.1.30), we can simplify the above to:
S t − (1 + r)S t−1 − Bt = νtnt+1 − (1 + r)νt−1nt
By (2.1.37), we have:
Vt − (1 + r)Vt−1 = νtnt+1 − (1 + r)νt−1nt
2.2 Calibrations
The parameter of physical capital intensity is generally accepted to be around 1/4 to
1/3 in the literature. In this model, we use β and θ to represent the intermediate good
intensity in the final production for manufacture and service goods. Assuming service
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sector is more labor-intensive, we have θ < β. The value of α is defined to be between
0 and 1. We have shown that the system will behave differently if α is below or above
β/(1 + β). For numerical simulations, we expand the region of β and θ so that it is
possible for the nonhomothetic preference curve to be below or above the homothetic
curve. Constraints (2.2.11) and (2.2.12) are satisfied for the values we choose.
If we assume the annual interest rate is around 2.5%, and one period for the over-
lapping generation is around 30 years, then interest rate r = 1.02530 − 1 ' 1. By
Constraint (2.2.17) we know that the value of r is upper bounded so that the homothetic
steady-state is economically meaningful.
The time preference rate ρ is assumed to be close to but higher than the interest rate
r, so that consumption level will drop slightly when agent retires. For all simulations,
we use ρ = 1.2. However, even the value of ρ varies, the outcome won’t be significantly
different.
The preference parameter for service good τ is assigned to be 5 in all simulations.
In Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001), this value is also around 5.
Parameter µ affects the productivity of the R&D sector. By Equation (2.2.18) we
know that µ need to be small enough for an economically meaningful steady-state.
Parameter C¯S controls consumers’ income elasticity for service good. It determines
the gap between nonhomothetic case and homothetic case, thus affects the speed of con-
vergence in nonhomothetic case to its asymptotic steady-state or cyclical vibration. In
Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001), C¯S is around 250. According to equation (2.2.9)
and (2.2.10), and using parameter values mentioned above, we have the following re-
sults: if nt−1 = 10, C¯S ≤ 13.5; if nt−1 = 100, C¯S ≤ 283. In most of our numerical
examples, we use min nt−1 = 100 and C¯S = 250.
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2.3 Transitional dynamics
Figure A1 Initial G0 = 3.00419, n0 = 1000
Homothetic steady-state Ght = 3.00419
Homothetic trade surplus over income (Bt/wt)h = −0.120118
Homothetic employment share of service sector LhS t = 0.543635
Homothetic nominal output ratio (PS tYS t/YMt)h = 29.1674
Homothetic nominal consumption ratio PS t(CS 1t + CS 2t)/(CM1t + CM2t)h = τ = 5
77
Figure A2 Initial G0 = 4.70142, n0 = 100
Homothetic steady-state Ght = 4.70142
Homothetic trade surplus over income (Bt/wt)h = −0.104886
Homothetic employment share of service sector LhS t = 0.594061
Homothetic nominal output ratio (PS tYS t/YMt)h = 24.3316
Homothetic nominal consumption ratio PS t(CS 1t + CS 2t)/(CM1t + CM2t)h = τ = 5
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Figure A3 Initial G0 = 4.01447, n0 = 104
Homothetic growth rate Ght = 4.01447
Homothetic trade surplus over income (Bt/wt)h = −0.031773
Homothetic employment share of service sector LhS t = 0.555232
Homothetic nominal output ratio (PS tYS t/YMt)h = 6.36613
Homothetic nominal consumption ratio PS t(CS 1t + CS 2t)/(CM1t + CM2t)h = τ = 5
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Figure A4 Initial G0 = 2.97121, n0 = 104
Homothetic growth rate Ght = 2.97121
Homothetic trade surplus over income (Bt/wt)h = 0.00102727
Homothetic employment share of service sector LhS t = 0.611954
Homothetic nominal output ratio (PS tYS t/YMt)h = 4.96872
Homothetic nominal consumption ratio PS t(CS 1t + CS 2t)/(CM1t + CM2t)h = τ = 5
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Figure A5 Initial G0 = 10.6041, n0 = 100
Homothetic growth rate Ght = 10.6041
Homothetic trade surplus over income (Bt/wt)h = −0.00370978
Homothetic employment share of service sector LhS t = 0.595394
Homothetic nominal output ratio (PS tYS t/YMt)h = 5.14424
Homothetic nominal consumption ratio PS t(CS 1t + CS 2t)/(CM1t + CM2t)h = τ = 5
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Figure A6 Initial G0 = 31.4028, n0 = 1015
Homothetic growth rate Ght = 31.4028
Homothetic trade surplus over income (Bt/wt)h = −0.00115027
Homothetic employment share of service sector LhS t = 0.573539
Homothetic nominal output ratio (PS tYS t/YMt)h = 5.04554
Homothetic nominal consumption ratio PS t(CS 1t + CS 2t)/(CM1t + CM2t)h = τ = 5
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Chapter 3
Nonhomothetic Tastes and Structural
change of a Small Open Economy with
Infinitely-Lived Agents
Introduction
In the previous chapter we studied the overlapping generation model of a small open
economy with two final good sectors: manufacture and service. We adopt an expanding-
product-variety framework and compared the structural change in homothetic and non-
homothetic taste systems. The nonhomothetic system will converge to the homothetic
system as the economy grows and this is resulted from the fact that the nonhomoth-
etic consumption behavior will gradually converge to be homothetic. Within the range
of reasonable parameter values, our numerical results in the OLG model are consistent
with the stylized facts of Erich Gundlach (1994). When the gap between the labor in-
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tensities of the manufacture sector and the service sector is very big (which could be
unrealistic), our results are different from the stylized facts. These results bring the first
question whether using the infinite representative agent model will be able to fit the styl-
ized facts better. Our second problem is that in the OLG model it is likely to have large
fluctuations in the growth rate when the new generation alters the investment in R&D.
By adopting the infinite representative agent model, we hope the growth path will be
smoother and thus more empirically reasonable.
There are two terms that we use repeatedly in the discussions. One is “economically
meaningful”, which requires the following conditions: 1) the growth rate is nonnegative;
2) both the manufacture and service sectors are producing and hiring; 3) both domestic
consumption for manufacture and service goods are positive; 4) monopoly profits are
nonnegative. Another term is “convergence”. In this model we find both the homothetic
and nonhomothetic system have transitional dynamics. Both systems will converge to
the asymptotic steady-state. Technically speaking, the asymptotic steady-state is the
limitation when time goes to infinity. In other words, the asymptotic steady-state cannot
be reached within finite periods. Thus, when we say the convergence is fast, we mean
the gap between the current state and the asymptotic steady-state drop below a certain
value (normally 10−6) within a short period.
In the following sections, Section 1 discusses the infinite horizon model. We will
compare the results of the infinite horizon model with the overlapping generation model
in Section 2 and finally, Section 3 concludes.
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3.1 Infinite Horizon Model
Producers
The set up of the production sectors of manufacture and service goods as well as the
intermediate goods are identical to the ones in Chapter 2 and thus the notations are
also the same. The production functions of the manufacture and service sector and the
composition of intermediate goods employed in each sector are the following. Again,











1/α, 0 < α < 1 (3.1.2)
YS t = AS L1−θS t D
θ
S t, 0 < θ < β (3.1.3)





Firms in both manufacture and service sector are competitive in output and input
markets. We let AM = (1 − β)β−1β−β and AS = (1 − θ)θ−1θ−θ in order to simplify the
results of the price levels and the market demands. Producers of intermediate goods
are assumed to be monopolistically competitive and the production for each unit of X j
requires one unit of labor input. Use w to denote wage rate and Pi the price of good i,
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Equation (3.1.5) is consistent with the fact that countries with higher technology levels
have higher labor income. Equation (3.1.6) is consistent with the first stylized fact by
Erich Gundlach (1994) such that in growing economies, the relative price of services
will rise in the long run.




(βPMtYMt + θPS tYS t) (3.1.7)
Following the assumption of a small open economy, manufacture goods are homo-
geneous and tradable. Capital can also move across borders but intermediate goods and
labor are nontradable. Let M be the numeraire (PMt ≡ 1) and the growth rate is defined
as gt ≡ n˙t/nt.
Consumers
We assume one representative agent with infinite horizon, who has nonhomothetic pref-
erences towards manufacture goods and service goods. Cit denotes consumption of good
i at time t. S t is her accumulated saving at time t, with interest rate r, which is deter-
mined by the world market and assumed to be constant. We use ρ as the rate of time
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e−ρt[ln CMt + τ ln(CS t + C¯S )]dt (3.1.8)
Here C¯S ≥ 0 and is constant, so the service good is more income elastic. This specifica-
tion includes the case when C¯S = 0, utility becomes homothetic.The budget constraint
at time t is:
S˙ t = rS t + wt −CMt −CS tPS t (3.1.9)
Using Hamiltonian to solve the optimization problem, we have
H = lnCMt + τln(CS t + C¯S ) + λt(rS t + wt −CMt −CS tPS t)









λ˙t = (ρ − r)λt or λt = λ0e(ρ−r)t (3.1.12)
The transversality condition is:
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλtS t = 0 (3.1.13)
To ensure CMt and CS t are economically meaningful, we need 1/λt > C¯S PS t/τ. The
second order condition of the maximizing problem also requires CMt > 0 and CS t > 0.
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R&D
The expanding-product-variety model presents technological improvements in terms of
increases in the measure of intermediate goods. We assume that the growth rate depends








The measure of intermediate goods is assumed to be nondecreasing over time. Thus it
is not economically meaningful to have gt < 0 in this model. We assume the inventor
of good j is also the producer. Once an intermediate good is invented, the producer can
enjoy monopoly profit in all the following periods. The profit is shown by (3.1.7). R&D
costs are financed by issuing equity. The value of equity for each firm is denoted by ν j,
which also equals to the discounted value of the firms’ future profits. The non-arbitrage
condition holds:
ν˙ jt = rν jt − pi jt (3.1.15)
As shown in Chapter II, the equilibrium is symmetric, i.e. pi j = pi and ν j = ν for all j.
The free entry condition holds when
νtn˙t = wtLrt (3.1.16)

























For a small open economy, as earlier stated, we assume only manufacture goods can
be traded in the international market and capital can move across borders. The service
market clears domestically. Labor supply is unitary, which equals to the aggregate labor
demand in final goods sector, intermediate goods sector and the R&D sector.
YS t = CS t (3.1.20)
1 = LMt + LS t +
∫ nt
0
L jtd j + Lrt (3.1.21)
=
1 − β + αβ
wt
YMt +
1 − θ + αθ
wt




Bt denotes the trade surplus of manufacture sector:
Bt = YMt −CMt (3.1.22)
Balance of payments equilibrium implies that net capital outflows equals to net ex-
ports plus net income from investment abroad. S t denotes saving as defined in con-
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sumer’s problem. Vt is defined as the accumulated investment in domestic market.
S˙ t − V˙t = Bt + r(S t − Vt) (3.1.23)
By Walras’ Law1, we can derive the equilibrium condition for the equity market:
V˙t + ntpit = rVt + n˙tνt (3.1.24)
V˙t − rVt = n˙tνt + ntν˙t − rntνt
The above shows that in the R&D sector, the increment in domestic investment plus
aggregate monopolistic profit will be used to pay interest and develop new intermediate
goods. One logical solution for (3.1.24) is
Vt = νtnt (3.1.25)
such that the accumulated investment in time t equals to the current value of the total













From Chapter 2, equation (2.1.8) and the above, we can get the employment share
1Details in Appendix 3.1
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of the service sector and the nominal output ratio of service and manufacture goods:
LS t =





(β − θ) {β −
(1 − β + αβ)rµ
(1 − α) −
gtµ




(1 − α)αβ − µ{α(1 − β + αβ)r + gt[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]}
µ{α(1 − θ + αθ)r + gt[α − (1 − α)β(1 − θ + αθ)]} − (1 − α)αθ (3.1.28)
Solve the Model







wt −CMt − PS tCS t − Bt
Vt
and substitute in (3.1.5), (3.1.6), (3.1.10), (3.1.11), (3.1.17) and (3.1.25)
(1 − α)β
α
gt = r +
1
µ











From (3.1.7) and (3.1.19), we have:






















Substituting (3.1.10), (3.1.11), (3.1.20) and (3.1.22) into (3.1.21), we get:
1 =
[(1 − β + αβ) + (1 − θ + αθ)τ]
wtλt
+
(1 − β + αβ)Bt
wt











(β − θ)τ [
(1 + τ)






− (β + θτ)
(β − θ)τ (3.1.32)
+
gtβµ
α(β − θ)τ {(1 − α)(β + θτ) −
(1 + τ)[(1 − α)β − α]
















− r(1 − β + αβ)µ
(1 − α)(β − θ) (3.1.33)
− gtµ
α(1 − α)(β − θ) [α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]}
Proposition 3.1 At the equilibrium, the consumption over wage ratio and the growth
rate is positively related if α < (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ); and is negatively related if α >
(1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ).
The proof is obvious using equation (3.1.33) and (3.1.10), (3.1.11). Note that the






= r − ρ (3.1.34)
2We have three equations for three unknowns: gt, Bt and λt. However, (3.1.29)-(3.1.31) are not
independent by Warlras’ Law.
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Using (3.1.12) and (3.1.33), we can derive the following3:






[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ [β −
r(1 − β + αβ)µ












[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ [β −
r(1 − β + αβ)µ











Also, using (3.1.33) and (3.1.34), we have:
(3.1.36)
g˙t =
α(1 − α)(r − ρ)
[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)] [
(1 − β + αβ)r
(1 − α) −
β
µ

















− (1 − β + αβ)(2r − ρ)
(1 − α) +
α(r − ρ)


















− (1 − β + αβ)(2r − ρ)
(1 − α) −
α(ρ − r)
(1 − α)2β ]




= −2(1 − α)β
α
< 0
3For analytical characterization of the dynamics, see Appendix 3.2
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Homothetic System
When C¯S = 0, the system is homothetic. And by equation (3.1.36), g˙t will be a function






α[(1 − α)β − (1 − β + αβ)rµ]
[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ
Figure 11 illustrate the motion of gt. We find g(1) or g(2) could either be stable or
unstable, depending on the parameter values, especially the value of ρ. When transi-
tional dynamics exist, which will be shown later, if g0 > min(g(1), g(2)), growth rate gt
will converge to max(g(1), g(2)) monotonically.
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[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ [β −
r(1 − β + αβ)µ





[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)][(1 − α)βg0 − (r − ρ)α]µ
α{(1 − α)2β2 + [α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]ρµ − αrµ}
Note that ght is a function of t and g0 only. If we let g0 = g(1) and substitute into (3.1.37),
then ght = g(1) for all t > 0. Similarly, if g0 = g(2), then g
h
t = g(2) for all t > 0. However,
the initial growth rate is not necessarily at the steady-state level.
Proposition 3.2 Transitional dynamics exist in the homothetic system. To satisfy the
transversality condition, the growth rate of the initial instant g0 should be determined
by the initial endowments w0 and S 0
g0 =
α
[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ {(1 − α)β − r(1 − β + αβ)µ +
(1 − α)(β − θ)ρτ{[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ − w−10 S 0[(1 − α)2β2 − rαµ]}
(1 − α)2β(β + θτ) − rαµ(1 + τ) }
Proof. See Appendix 3.4. 
We will discuss the homothetic system in two cases:
Case 1: g(1) > g(2)
4See detailed derivation in Appendix 3.3.
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(1 − α)β = g(1)







[g0 − g(2)] exp[ (1−α)βα g(2)ε − (r − ρ)ε] + [g(1) − g(2)]ξ exp[ (1−α)βα g(2)(t + ε) − (r − ρ)(t + ε)]
[g0 − g(2)] + [g(1) − g(2)]ξ exp[ (1−α)βα g(2)(t + ε) − (r − ρ)(t + ε)]
 (0, 1)
which means that the convergence towards g(1) is monotonic for g0 > g(2).5 The fol-
lowings give further descriptions of steady-state g(1):
At g(1), consumptions should be positive for the steady-state to be economically






(β − θ)τ [β −
α(r − ρ)µ
(1 − α)2β −
(1 − β + αβ)ρµ






(β − θ) [β −
α(r − ρ)µ
(1 − α)2β −
(1 − β + αβ)ρµ
(1 − α) ] (3.1.39)
Thus we can derive at g(1), agent spends a fixed portion of her current wage income on
5See parameter restrictions in Proposition 3.3 and (3.1.45)-(3.1.48).
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consumptions.6




(β − θ)τ [β −
α(r − ρ)µ
(1 − α)2β −
(1 − β + αβ)ρµ
(1 − α) ] (3.1.40)
The R&D profit for each firm at g(1) should be nonnegative. Parameter restrictions
are also stated in Proposition 3.3.
pit =
µwt
(1 − α)βnt {[(1 − α)β − α]ρ + αr} (3.1.41)
The following figures are constant at g(1): trade surplus over wage, nominal output





(β − θ)τ {
α(1 + τ)(r − ρ)
(1 − α)2β + [
1 + τ







(1 − α)2β2 − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)µρ − αµ(r − ρ)
(1 − α)β(1 − θ + αθ)µρ + αµ(r − ρ) − (1 − α)2βθ (3.1.43)
LS t =
(1 − θ)
(1 − α)(β − θ) [(1 − α)β − (1 − β + αβ)µρ −
αµ(r − ρ)
(1 − α)β ] (3.1.44)
We summarize the above conditions for steady-state g(1) in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3.3 For g(1) to be locally stable and economically meaningful, we have the
6Discussion for propensity to consume at g(1): (CMt + PS tCS t)/(rS t + wt) is in Appendix 3.5
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following necessary conditions:
α ≤ (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)
ρ ≤ r < (1 − α)
2β2 + [α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]ρµ
αµ
r >
(1 − α)2βθ + [α − (1 − α)β(1 − θ + αθ)]ρµ
αµ
The proof is obvious from g(1) > g(2), and equation (3.1.40), (3.1.43), (3.1.44) to
be strictly positive, and (3.1.41) to be nonnegative. The above conditions are consistent
with each other. Note that when α = (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ), we have a very special case
such that g(2) does not exist. And by equation (3.1.33), λtwt is always constant in the
homothetic system, which means the system is always at g(1).
As stated in Proposition 3.2, there exist transitional dynamics in the homothetic
sytem. From Figure 1 we know that for the convergence path to be nonnegative and
monotonic, we need g0 > min(g(1), g(2)) and g0 ≥ 0. From Proposition 3.2, we can
derive the following conditions. First, for CM0 > 0 or λ0 > 0, we need:
r <
(1 − α)2β(β + θτ)
α(1 + τ)µ
(3.1.45)




[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ
(1 − α)2β2 − αrµ (3.1.46)
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(1 − α)(β − θ)[(1 − α)2β2 − αrµ]ρτ {(1 − α)
3β2(β + θτ) (3.1.47)
−(1 − α)2β2(1 − β + αβ)(r + ρτ)µ + α(1 − β + αβ)r2(1 + τ)µ2
−(1 − α)β[α + (1 − α)θ(1 − β + αβ)](r − ρ)τµ − α(1 − α)(βr + θρτ)µ}
Also, to ensure both of the service and manufacture sectors exist during the convergence,
by equation (3.1.27) and (3.1.28), we need:
α[(1 − α)β − (1 − β + αβ)rµ]
[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ = g(2) < g0 <
α[(1 − α)θ − (1 − θ + αθ)rµ]
[α − (1 − α)β(1 − θ + αθ)]µ (3.1.48)
Using the conditions in Proposition 3.3 and (3.1.45) - (3.1.48), we can determine
the range of parameter values for the simulation. Figure 12 illustrate the transitional
dynamics when g(1) > g(2) and g0 > g(2). If parameter values satisfy conditions in
Proposition 3.3 and (3.1.45) - (3.1.48), the homothetic system will behave similarly
to the numerical examples illustrated in Figure 12.7 As shown in the followings, the
savings (or debts when S t < 0) will expand exponentially, but the trasversality condition
of e−ρtλtS t will drop to zero as time goes to infinity.
7We use Mathematica for simulations, the machine precision is approximately 16 digits. Parameter
values chosen for Figure 12 are: α = 0.15, β = 0.3, θ = 0.1, r = 1.2, ρ = 1, τ = 5, µ = 0.1 and n0 = 100.
The two homothetic steady-states are g(1) = 0.117647, g(2) = −6.21388, and g(1) is stable. The range of
gt is [0, 0.446445).
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As shown in Figure 12, in Case 1 a higher initial endowment leads to a higher
initial growth rate, which can be proved using Proposition 3.3 and (3.1.45). When
α < (1−α)β(1−β+αβ), by Proposition 3.1 we know consumption over wage CMt/wt (as
well as CS tPS t/wt) and growth rate gt are positively related. Therefore, when the initial
endowment S 0 is high (plotted in red), the economy will have a short period of high con-
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sumption (relative to wage level) to consume the extra savings. Such high consumption
will also encourage investment in the R&D sector and hence lead to a high growth rate.
The trade balance will start at a large deficit and the production and employment share
of the service sector will be high in order to supply the high demand in both manufacture
and services. The manufacture sector is more intermediate goods intensive than the ser-
vice sector, the total profit in intermediate goods market over wage ntpit/wt hence starts
low as a result of the low share of the manufacture sector. The initial endowment will be
consumed fast, as a result, both consumption and investment will decrease over time and
converge8 to the steady-state g(1) level. Trade deficit will decrease since production and
labor shift from service and R&D to the manufacture sector. As the manufacture sector
expands, ntpit/wt also grows. The same rationale applies when the initial endowment
is low (plotted in black). Consumption will start low to restore the savings. The low
consumption will also discourage the investment in the R&D sector and lead to a low
growth rate. Trade deficit starts low but increases over time as the manufacture sector
shrinks. The service sector, on the other hand, expands to meet the higher demands.
Note that when the initial endowment and the initial growth rate are low, the simulation
results are consistent with the stylized facts of Erich Gundlach (1994).
Case 2: g(1) ≤ g(2):






α[(1 − α)β − (1 − β + αβ)rµ]
[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ = g(2)
8At t = 2, |gt − g(1)| < 10−10.
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[g(2) − g0] + [g(2) − g(1)]ξ exp[ (1−α)βα g(2)t − (r − ρ)t]
[g(2) − g0] + [g(2) − g(1)]ξ exp[ (1−α)βα g(2)(t + ε) − (r − ρ)(t + ε)]
 (0, 1)
which means that the convergence towards g(2) is monotonic for g(1) < g0 < g(2).9
Substituting g(2) to (3.1.11) and (3.1.33), we find the ratio of consumption for man-
ufacture goods and service over wage income are both zero. Also, by (3.1.27) and
(3.1.28), the service sector is not producing or hiring at g(2), i.e. YS t = 0 and LS t = 0.
This state is rather a corner solution than an economically meaningful steady-state.
However, if transitional dynamics exist, then g(2) is only asymptotic and cannot be
reached within finite time. The convergence path towards g(2) could still be economi-
cally meaningful and optimal. Thus, discussion for g(2) is still necessary.




[α(1 + rµ) − (1 − α)β]
[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)] (3.1.49)
Proposition 3.4 For g(2) to be nonnegative and stable, and the monopoly profits to be
nonnegative, we have the following necessary conditions:
α > (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)
(1 − α)2β2
αµ
< r ≤ (1 − α)
2β2 + [α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]ρµ
αµ
9See parameter restrictions in Proposition 3.4 and (3.1.50)-(3.1.52).
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The proof is obvious from g(2) ≥ g(1), and (3.1.49) to be nonnegative. The above
conditions are consistent with each other.
For the convergence path to be nonnegative and monotonic, we need g0 > g(1)(> 0).
Using Proposition 3.2, we can derive the following conditions. First, for CM0 > 0 or
λ0 > 0, we need:
r >
(1 − α)2β(β + θτ)
α(1 + τ)µ
(3.1.50)
Note that this also guarantees that all CMt > 0 during the convergence towards g(2).




(1 − α)2β(β + θτ) − αr(1 + τ)µ + [α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]ρ(1 + τ)µ
(1 − α)2β(β − θ)ρτ (3.1.51)
Also, to ensure the service sector is producing during the convergence, by equation
(3.1.27) and (3.1.28), we need:
α[(1 − α)β − (1 − β + αβ)rµ]
[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ = g(2) > g0 >
α[(1 − α)θ − (1 − θ + αθ)rµ]
[α − (1 − α)β(1 − θ + αθ)]µ (3.1.52)
Using the conditions in Proposition 3.4 and (3.1.50) - (3.1.52), we can determine
the range of parameter values for the simulation. Figure 13 illustrates the transitional
dynamics when g(2) > g(1) and g0 > g(1). If parameter values satisfy conditions in
Proposition 3.4 and (3.1.50) - (3.1.52), the homothetic system will behave similarly to
the numerical examples illustrated in Figure 13.10 As shown in the followings, even
when the saving rate goes to 1, debts can still be accumulating if the initial debt is large
10Parameter values chosen for Figure 13 are: α = 0.4, β = 0.3, θ = 0.2, r = 1.2, ρ = 1, τ = 5, µ = 0.1
and n0 = 100. The two homothetic steady-states are g(1) = 0.444444, g(2) = 1.29319, and g(2) is stable.
The range of gt is (g(1), g(2)).
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enough. The transversality condition on the other hand, still goes to zero.
As shown in Figure 13, in Case 2 higher initial endowment leads to lower ini-
tial growth rate, which can be proved using Proposition 3.4 and (3.1.50). When α >
(1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ), by Proposition 3.1 we know consumption over wage CMt/wt (and
CS tPS t/wt) and growth rate gt are negatively related. Therefore, when the initial endow-
ment S 0 is higher (plotted in red), the economy will start with high consumptions but
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low investment to consume the extra savings. Same as in Case 1, the trade balance will
start at a large deficit and the production and employment share of the service sector
will be high to meet the high demand in both manufacture and services. The total profit
in immediate goods market over wage ntpit/wt starts low as the share of the manufac-
ture sector is small. The initial endowment will be consumed slower than in Case 1,
which results in a slower convergence path11. As the saving drops, consumptions over
wage will decrease over time and converge toward the steady-state g(2) level. Note that
during the convergence, the actual consumptions will still be increasing but at a pace
slower than the growth rate of wage. Production and labor will shift from service to
manufacture as well as to the R&D sector. Therefore growth rate increases and trade
deficit decreases. As the manufacture sector expands, ntpit/wt also grows.
Nonhomothetic System
When C¯S > 0, the system is nonhomothetic. As shown by (3.1.35) and (3.1.36), when
gt > 0, as nt grows, the system will gradually converge to the homothetic system. By




(1 − α)(β − θ) > g(1)
Figure 14(a) and 14(b) plot (3.1.36) in the nonhomothetic systems. As shown in Figure
14(a), where g(1) > g(2), the nonhomothetic g˙nont is higher than the homothetic g˙
homo
t
when gt < g(3), and lower when gt > g(3). In Figure 14(b), where g(1) < g(2), g˙nont ≷
g˙homot when gt ≷ g(3). It is also true in both 14(a) and 14(b), when gt = max[g(1), g(2)],
11At t = 30, |gt − g(2)| < 10−5.
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nonhomothetic system with lower nt has a higher |g˙t|. This is because smaller economies
(lower nt) have a lower wage rate and thus a lower R&D cost. The same amount of
investment adjustment will result in a larger fluctuation of the growth rate in a smaller
economy than in a larger one.
As explained in Chapter 2, Proposition 2.2, as nt grows, proportion of wage income
spent on consumptions in the nonhomothetic system will converge to the one in the
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homothetic system. When nt is large enough, consumers in the nonhomothetic system
will behave the same as in the homothetic system. The stable homothetic steady-state
g(1) or g(2) will be the asymptotic steady-states of the nonhomothetic system.
Similar to the homothetic system, the initial g0 depends on n0 and S 0 in order to
satisfy the transversality condition. The analytical solution cannot be derived, but the
numerical relation of g0 and S 0 for any given n0 can be obtained by simulations. Further
results will be shown in the case discussions and in Appendix 3.6, where we point out
that the numerical relation of g0 and S 0 for any given n0 is expected to be unique.
Case 1: g(1) is the asymptotic steady-state: When the necessary conditions in
Proposition 3.3 and (3.1.45)-(3.1.48) are satisfied, the nonhomothetic system will con-
verge to g(1) and the convergence path with be economically meaningful. Figure 15(a)
and 15(b) illustrate the numerical relations of g0 and S 0 that satisfies the transversality
condition. The economically meaningful range of g0 is determined by (3.1.48).12 As
shown by the following figures, a higher endowment leads to a higher initial growth
rate, which is similar to the homothetic case 1.
12Parameter values chosen for Figure 15(a), 15(b) and 16 are: α = 0.15, β = 0.3, θ = 0.1, r = 1.2, ρ = 1,
τ = 5, µ = 0.1, C¯S = 250. The two homothetic steady-states are g(1) = 0.117647, g(2) = −6.21388, and
g(1) is asymptotically stable in the nonhomothetic system. By (3.1.48), the range of gt (including g0) is
[0, 0.446445).
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Figure 16 illustrates the convergence13 of the nonhomothetic system with two dif-
ferent initial endowments. If parameter values satisfy Proposition 3.3 and (3.1.45)-
(3.1.48), the nonhomothetic system will behave similarly to the numerical example il-
lustrated in the following. Similar to the homothetic case 1, by Proposition 3.1, when
α < (1−α)β(1− β+αβ), consumption over wage (CMt + CS tPS t)/wt and the growth rate
gt are positively related. Therefore, when the initial endowment and the growth rate are
high (plotted in red), the economy will have a short period of high consumption (rela-
tive to the wage level) and high investment (thus a high growth rate). Since the demand
for both manufacture goods and services are high, the production and the employment
share of the service sector will be high, and the import of the manufacture goods will
also be high, which lead to a large trade deficit. The total profit in intermediate goods
market over wage ntpit/wt starts low as the share of the manufacture sector is low. The
growth rate converges fast to the steady-state level. Trade deficit over wage decreases as
production and labor shift from service and R&D to manufactures. As the manufacture
sector expands, ntpit/wt also grows. The same rationale applies when the initial growth
rate is low (plotted in black). The trade deficit over wage and the consumption over
13gt converges very fast, at t = 0.1, |gt − g(1)| < 10−11. At t = 50, the transversality condition
|e−ρtλtS t | < 10−6.
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wage do converge to the homothetic steady-state level. However, as a result of the non-
homothetic tastes, the convergence paths are much slower compared to the homothetic
system and could be nonmonotonic.
Case 2: g(2) is the asymptotic steady-state: When the necessary conditions in
Proposition 3.4 and (3.1.50)-(3.1.52) are satisfied, the nonhomothetic system will con-
verge asymptotically to g(2) with an economically meaningful convergence path. Though
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g(2) is not a valid steady-state, the convergence path in the nonhomothetic system could
still be optimal and economically meaningful. By (3.1.33), we know the ratio of con-
sumption over wage is dropping to approach zero as the representative agent keeps in-
creasing her saving rate. However, from (3.1.34) the real value of consumption for
manufacture goods is still growing over time as r > ρ.
Figure 17(a) and 17(b) illustrate the numerical relations of g0 and S 0 that satisfies
the transversality condition. The range of g0 is determined by (3.1.52).14 We can see
that a higher endowment leads to a lower initial growth rate, which is consistent with
the homothetic case 2.
14Parameter values for Figure 17(a), 17(b) and 18 are: α = 0.4, β = 0.3, θ = 0.2, r = 1.2, ρ = 1, τ = 5,
µ = 0.1, C¯S = 250. g(1) = 0.444444, g(2) = 1.29319, and g(2) is asymptotically stable. The range of gt
is (g(1), g(2)).
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The following figure illustrates the convergence15 of the nonhomothetic system with
two different initial growth rates. If parameter values satisfy Proposition 3.4 and (3.1.50)-
(3.1.52), the nonhomothetic system will behave similarly to the numerical example il-
lustrated below. Note that when n0 is too small, the convergence path is not econom-
ically meaningful, i.e. the production and labor share of the service sector is nega-
tive for some periods16. Similar to the homothetic case 2, by Proposition 3.1 when
α > (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ), consumption over wage and the growth rate are negatively
related. Therefore when the initial endowment is low and the growth rate is high (plotted
in red), the economy will start with lower consumptions. The trade balance will start at
a larger surplus and the production and the employment share of the service sector are
lower since the demand for both manufacture and services are low. The total profit in in-
termediate goods market over wage ntpit/wt starts high as a result of a higher share of the
manufacture sector. gt converges much slower than in Case 1. Consumption over wage
will decrease over time and converge to the steady-state level. The actual consumption
is still increasing but at a rate slower than the growth rate of wage. Production and labor
shift from service to manufacture as well as to the R&D sector. Therefore the growth
rate increases and trade deficit decreases. As the manufacture sector expands, ntpit/wt
also grows.
15At t = 50, |gt − g(2)| < 10−6. At t = 100, the transversality condition |e−ρtλtS t | < 10−6.
16See illustration in Appendix 3.7, Figure A7.
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3.2 Comparison between the OLG and IH model
We have studied the nonhomothetic tastes and structural change using two different
models: the overlapping generation model (OLG) and the infinite horizon model (IH).
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Since most of the assumptions are identical except on the consumer’s problems, we can
find similar preliminary results.
1. The growth rate of real wage wt in OLG is G
(1−α)β
α








t ; in IH is
(1−α)(β−θ)
α
gt; which are consistent with the first stylized facts of
Erich: a rise in the relative price of service.
3. With technological progress, consumption behavior in the nonhomothetic system
will be converging to the ones in the homothetic system. Since nt grows with techno-
logical progress, C¯S /(αθn
(1−α)θ
α



































4. With technological progress, the equilibrium discounted value of a R&D firm’s
future profit will increase if (1 − α)β/α > 1 and decrease if (1 − α)β/α < 1. The growth
rate of vt in OLG is G
(1−α)β
α −1




In both models, we have multiple steady-states in the homothetic system and only
one of the states is stable. By using the IH model, we are able to derive further analytical
results such as the closed form solutions of the steady-state and also to prove the con-
ditions of the convergence towards the steady-states. In both models, as a result of the
product variety expansion, consumption behavior of the nonhomothetic consumers will
converge to be homothetic. Thus the nonhomothetic system converges to the homothetic
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system as nt grows. The stable steady-state in the homothetic system is the asymptotic
steady-state of the nonhomothetic system. One important finding of this chapter is that
unlike the OLG model, the homothetic system of the IH model requires transitional dy-
namics in order to satisfy the transversality condition. In the OLG model on the other
hand, transversality condition is automatically satisfied.
For the nonhomothetic system in the OLG Model, we have the following numerical
results with the assumption that the initial growth rate equals to the homothetic steady-
state value. First, the nonhomothetic system will converge to the asymptotic steady-state
if the monopoly mark-up is high enough or equivalently when α is small enough. The
convergence path is either smooth or fluctuating around the steady-state, depending on
the value of α. Secondly, when the gap between the labor intensities of the service
sector and the manufacture sector is small enough; it is possible to have higher tran-
sitional growth rates than the steady-state value. The simulation results are consistent
with Erich’s stylized facts when the parameter values are empirically realistic. At the
early stages of the transitions, the employment share and nominal output share of the
service sector could increase first, and then converge (monotonically or nonmonoton-
ically) to the homothetic steady-state level. The real output share could increase first
then decrease over time.
For the nonhomothetic system of the IH Model, we can conclude a few numerical
results for the transitional dynamics: First, the convergence path of the nonhomothetic
system could be nonmonotonic but always smooth (unlike in the OLG model with fluc-
tuations). Secondly, when g(1) is the stable steady-state, a higher initial endowment
leads to a higher initial growth rate. When g(2) is the stable steady-state, a higher initial
endowment leads to a lower initial growth rate. Thirdly, when g(1) is stable and the
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initial growth rate is lower than g(1), the employment share and nominal output share
of the service sector will increase at the early stages of the transitions, which is consis-
tent with Erich’s stylized facts. When g(2) is asymptotically stable, the service sector
will diminish although the relative price of service to manufacture still grows over time.
Consumers will keep on increasing their investment in the R&D sector. Their con-
sumption over income ratio keeps on decreasing while the real consumption level is still
increasing over time. Majority of the manufacture goods will be exported. Since service
goods can only be consumed domestically, the production share of the service sector
will shrink. Based on our analysis we can conclude that steady-state g(1) is empirically
more likely.
By comparing the simulation results of the two models, we find that as a result of the
existence of the transitional dynamics, the IH model is able to capture Erich’s stylized
facts even when the consumers’ tastes towards manufacture and service are homothetic.
In fact, when the technology level is high enough, the qualitative difference between the
nonhomothetic case and the homothetic case is not significant, since the nonhomothetic
case will be approximating towards the homothetic case as the number of varieties of
intermediate goods grows. When the initial technology level is low, there will be a clear
numerical difference between the nonhomothetic case and the homothetic case, espe-
cially at the initial stages of the convergence paths.17 And when the technology level
is too low, the convergence paths of the nonhomothetic system might not even be eco-
nomically meaningful as the output or employment share of the service sector could fall
17In the nonhomothetic case of the IH model, the lower the initial technology level, the further away
the convergence paths from the paths in the homothetic system at the early stages. Similarly, in the
nonhomothetic system of the OLG model, the lower the initial technology level, the larger fluctuations in
the transitional dynamics.
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below zero for some periods.18 However, when the technology level is high enough to
guarantee positive convergence paths, as long as Proposition 3.3 and conditions (3.1.45)
- (3.1.48) are satisfied, and the initial growth rate is below g(1), the convergence paths
of the nonhomothetic case will be consistent with Erich’s facts.
When the consumers’ tastes are nonhomothetic, unlike in the OLG model, in the IH
model the behavior of the convergence paths does not depend on the gap between the
labor intensities of the manufacture and the service sector. However, for the transitional
dynamics of the IH model to be consistent with the stylized facts in both homothetic
and nonhomothetic cases, there are two necessary conditions. First, similar to the OLG
model, the monopoly mark-up of the R&D firms should be high enough. Secondly, the
initial growth rate needs to be below the steady-state growth rate g(1). On the contrary,
in the nonhomothetic case of the OLG model, when the gap between the labor intensi-
ties of the manufacture and the service is small and the simulation results are consistent
with the stylized facts, the growth rate always jumps up at the beginning of the con-
vergence. Thus, to determine which approach is empirically more suitable, we need to
consider the technology level of the economy, the gap between the labor intensities of
the manufacture and the service, and also the growth rate.
18The condition for the minimum technology level to guarantee a positive convergence path is different
in the two cases: when g(1) is the stable steady-state, the requirement for technology level is not high, the
lower bound for nt is less than 100; when g(2) is stable, the lower bound for nt is much higher, between
106 and 107. In Appendix 3.7, we demonstrate the case when g(2) is stable and n0 = 1000.
116
3.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we have discussed the nonhomothetic tastes of consumers and the struc-
tural change using an infinite horizon agent model. We have also compared our results
with the overlapping generation model in Chapter 2.
As we have discussed in the previous section, in the IH model the convergence paths
of the growth rates are much smoother than the convergence paths in the OLG model,
and thus are more empirically reasonable. For the transitional dynamics of the OLG
model to be consistent with Erich’s stylized facts, the monopoly mark-up of the R&D
firms should be high enough and the gap between the labor intensities of the manufacture
and the service should be small enough. Also, the initial growth rate of the convergence
path always jumps up to be higher than the steady-state value. On the other hand, for
the convergence paths of the IH model to be realistic, the monopoly mark-up should
be high and the initial growth rate should be below the steady-state value. As a result,
the empirically applications of the two models depend on the status (current growth
rate, labor intensities of the manufacture and the service, technology level etc.) of the
economy that we want to study.
Another interesting result in this chapter is that there exists transitional dynamics in
the homothetic system of the IH model in order to satisfy the transversality condition.
The initial growth rate is determined by the initial endowment as well as the technology
level. Similarly, in the nonhomothetic system, the numerical relationship of the initial
growth rate and the initial endowment is unique for each technology level. Note this is a
small open economy such that wealth accumulations are not bounded by the growth rate
of productivity. By setting the initial growth rate, the economy will be able to consume
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the extra savings or accumulate to pay the initial debts at the early stages of the conver-
gence. Thus the existence of the transitional dynamics (especially under homotheticity)
in the IH model is due to the excess or insufficient amount of asset at the beginning of
the representative agent’s life. However, agents in the OLG model have no initial en-
dowments but only labor incomes. Barro and Sala-i-Martin have discussed that when
agents in the OLG model are altruistic, such that they care for the children’s utilities and
have a bequest motive, there will be intergenerational transfers and the finite-horizon
effect of the OLG model will vanish. Therefore we think allowing intended bequests in
the OLG model can serve to bring the results of the OLG and the IH models closer.
Appendices
3.1 Walras’ Law, Continuous Time Model
Using (3.1.7), (3.1.9), (3.1.15) and (3.1.20)-(3.1.22), we have
wt = S˙ t − rS t + PMtCMt + PS tCS t
= S˙ t − rS t + PMtYMt + PS tYS t − Bt
= (1 − β + αβ)PMtYMt + (1 − θ + αθ)PS tYS t + n˙tνt
S˙ t − rS t = Bt + n˙tνt − ntpit
= Bt + n˙tνt + ntν˙t − rntνt
V˙t − rVt = n˙tνt + ntν˙t − rntνt
118






When z˙t < 0, we have gt >
α(r−ρ)
(1−α)β ; when z˙t = 0, we have gt =
α(r−ρ)








= (r − ρ) − (1 − α)β
α
gt
= (r − ρ) − (1 − α)β
α
(γa − γbzt)









Substituting back to the z˙t function, we can derive the following:





rαµ − (1 − α)2β2






[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ [β −
r(1 − β + αβ)µ













(1 − α)2β(β − θ)C¯S
αθ[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ
where γc, γd and γe are constant. When the system is nonhomothetic, i.e. γe , 0,
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analytical solution does not exist. When the system is homothetic, γe = 0, we can solve
zt as the following:
zt = γc{(γcz0 + γd)e
γct − γd}−1
where z0 = n
− (1−α)βα
0 is the initial condition. Thus
gt = γa − γbzt
= γa + γbγc{γd − (γcz0 + γd)e
γct}−1
which is identical to equation (3.1.37).
3.3 Derivation from (3.1.35) to (3.1.37)




= γa − γbe(r−ρ)tn(t)− (1−α)βα
where γa and γb are time invariable in the homothetic system. We get
n(t) = { γb(1 − α)βe
(r−ρ)t
α(ρ − r) + γa(1 − α)β + e
γa
(1−α)β
α tξ} α(1−α)β n0
where ξ is a constant and can be solved using initial conditions. substituting the n(t)
equation back, we get equation (3.1.37).
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3.4 Initial condition for the Transversality condition of continuous
time homothetic system
Let CMt+PS tCS t = (1−ζt)wt, where ζt could be varying during the transitional dynamics.
Thus S˙ t = rS t + ζtwt. If we define χt = e−rtS t, for the transversality condition to be
satisfied, limt→∞ χt = 0. We have:
χ˙t = −rχt + e−rtS˙ t
= −rχt + e−rt(rS t + ζtwt)
= e−rtζtwt
= e−rt(1 − 1 + τ
λtwt










α(ρ − r) + γa(1 − α)β + e
γa
(1−α)β

































χt = (1 − e−ρ t)γc
ρ





r − γa (1−α)βα
+ χ0
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where χ0 = S 0. It is easy to show when max(g(1), g(2)) < αr(1−α)β
lim








r − γa (1−α)βα
Thus, for limt→∞ χt = 0, we can solve for λ0,
λ0 =
(1 − α)2β(β + θτ) − α(1 + τ)rµ
{[(1 − α)2β2 − αrµ]S 0 − αβn
(1−α)β
α
0 [α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ}ρ
Using equation (3.1.33) to solve for g0, we have
g0 =
α[(1 − α)β − r(1 − β + αβ)µ − (1−α)(β−θ)τ
λ0w0
]
[α − (1 − α)β(1 − β + αβ)]µ
Substituting λ0 into g0, we get the g0 function of w0 and S 0 in Proposition 3.1.
3.5 Propensity to consume at continuous time homothetic steady-
state
From equation (3.1.41) we let CMt + PS tCS t = (1 − ζ)wt, where 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1 is constant at
g(1), or equals to one at g(2). Together with equation (3.1.9), we have:
S˙ t = rS t + ζwt
We can then solve for S t. Assuming initial conditions S 0, and g0 = g∗, we have:
S t = ζ(ertw0 − wt)[r − (1 − α)β
α
g∗]−1 + ertS 0
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Therefore propensity to consume at homothetic steady-state g(1) is
CMt + PS tCS t
rS t + wt
=
ρ(1 − ζ)wt
rert(ζw0 + ρS 0) + (ρ − rζ)wt
However, since ert/wt is not constant at steady-state g(1), the propensity to consume is
not constant.
3.6 Numerical solution of the initial growth rate in the Nonhomoth-
etic system
Since the analytical solution of g0 cannot be derived, we use numerical methods to find
the relationship between g0 and S 0 for different n0 levels. From Proposition 3.1 we
know that at a given n0 level, g0 and S 0 have a monotonic relationship in the homothetic
system. Since the nonhomothetic system is converging to the homothetic system as nt
grows, the relationship between g0 and S 0 should also be converging to the equation in
Proposition 3.1 as n0 increases. It is natural for us to assume that in the nonhomothetic
system, the relationship between g0 and S 0 is also monotonic, i.e. the solution for g0 is
unique. Our numerical results has shown that for a given n0 and g0, for a large range
of S 0, the relationship between S 0 and e−ρtλtS t for a large t is monotonic. This proves
that for a given g0, the solution for S 0 is unique. After n0 is chosen, the first step of the
simulation is to determine the economically meaningful range of gt by (3.1.48). Then
for the chosen g0 values within the range, we use binary search to find the S 0 value such
that after 2500 recursive steps, |e−ρtλtS t| < 10−6.Since Case 1 is converging faster than
Case 2, we use t = 50 for Case 1 and t = 100 for Case 2.
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Case 1: g(1) is asymptotically stable. The parameter values we use are the same as
for Figure 16: α = 0.15, β = 0.3, θ = 0.1, r = 1.2, ρ = 1, τ = 5, µ = 0.1, C¯S = 250. The
two homothetic steady-states are g(1) = 0.117647 and g(2) = −6.21388. The range of
gt (including g0) is [0, 0.446445). Table A1 below shows the numerical solutions plotted
in Figure 15(a) and 15(b).
Table A1
Nonhomothetic Transversality Condition Case 1
n0 = 100 n0 = 1000












Case 2: g(2) is asymptotically stable. The parameter values are the same as for
Figure 18: α = 0.4, β = 0.3, θ = 0.2, r = 1.2, ρ = 1, τ = 5, µ = 0.1, C¯S = 250.
g(1) = 0.444444, g(2) = 1.29319, and g(2) is asymptotically stable. The range of gt is
(g(1), g(2)). Table A2 below shows the numerical solutions plotted in Figure 17(a) and
17(b).
Table A2
Nonhomothetic Transversality Condition Case 2
n0 = 1000 n0 = 107












3.7 Nonhomothetic Case 2, when n0 is small
As shown in Figure A7 (same parameter values as in Figure 18), at the initial stages of
the convergence, the consumption over wage and the production and employment share
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